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Mark was a profoundly valued member of Trinity Chambers and of the Bar, which he joined following a long career as a solicitor and partner with Sternberg Reed Taylor and Gill. For those of us fortunate to be in hearings with him, it was a thrilling joy to see him rise to his feet, whether to question a professional witness, challenge a party, or make submissions. With often quiet diligence and always with determination, he made his points in court with a clarity, courtesy, and conciseness that often cut razor-like through the background noise to the heart of the matter. When Mark stood up, we all listened. And we learned.

Mark’s dedication to Trinity Chambers was complete and wholehearted. He would attend social and learning events ready to engage and share his experience and wisdom, always with great modesty and ease.

To members of Chambers, he was a kind friend and reassuring presence, whether with an open ear on a challenging legal issue or with shepherding lost members on a Chambers’ rugby tour to Rome or a long weekend of opera in Wexford.

We are sorry to announce Mark’s death in February 2026 after a long illness. For details of the funeral, please contact the clerking team: clerks@trinitychambers.com

We are left with the memories of his kindness, his compassion, and his generosity, and will be forever grateful that he was part of Chambers and legal practice in Essex.

The post Mark Taylor (1955-2026): A Tribute appeared first on Trinity Chambers.

The Role of the Litigation Friend and the Official Solicitor
When a parent is assessed as lacking capacity and there is no one available or willing to serve as a litigation next friend, the Official Solicitor should be contacted to seek her consent to act. The Office of the Official Solicitor and Public Trustee maintains a helpful website, which includes Standard Instructions for solicitors instructed by the Official Solicitor. These instructions clarify the respective roles and expectations of the Official Solicitor. Importantly, a Litigation Friend for Civil Litigation referral form must be completed before requesting that the Official Solicitor agree to act as litigation friend.

Determining Capacity
If there is concern that a parent involved in proceedings may lack the mental capacity to conduct those proceedings, this issue should be determined as a matter of priority and as early as possible. A parent who lacks capacity is considered a “protected party.” This means they cannot conduct litigation either as a litigant in person or through a solicitor; instead, a litigation friend must be appointed to act on their behalf.

A protected party is defined as “a party, or an intended party, who lacks capacity [within the meaning of the Mental Capacity Act 2005] to conduct proceedings.” The applicable test is found in Sections 2 and 3 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, and these sections must be read alongside the overarching principles in Section 1(2), (3), and (4) of the Act.

Understanding Lack of Capacity
For the purposes of the Act, a person is considered to lack capacity in relation to a matter if, at the material time, they are unable to make a decision for themselves due to an impairment of or disturbance in the functioning of their mind or brain. The impairment or disturbance may be permanent or temporary. Lack of capacity cannot be established merely by reference to a person’s age, appearance, or a condition or aspect of behaviour that may lead to unjustified assumptions.
In any proceedings, the question of whether a person lacks capacity must be decided on the balance of probabilities.

Criteria for Inability to Make Decisions
Section 2 of the Act states that a person is unable to make a decision for themselves if they cannot:
• Understand the information relevant to the decision;
• Retain that information;
• Use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision; or
• Communicate their decision (whether by talking, sign language, or any other means).

A person is not considered able to understand relevant information if they cannot understand an explanation of it in a manner appropriate to their circumstances, such as using simple language, visual aids, or other means. The ability to retain information for only a short time does not prevent a person from being considered able to make the decision. Relevant information also includes the reasonably foreseeable consequences of making a particular decision or failing to do so.

Presumption of Capacity
The starting point in every case is the statutory principle (Section 1(2) MCA 2005) that a person must be assumed to have capacity unless it is established otherwise. It follows that a person must be presumed to have the capacity to conduct proceedings in which they are involved. Declaring that a party lacks capacity has significant legal consequences and must be based on sound legal grounds and proper evidence. Such a finding should only be made with great care, as it deprives a person of the right to bring or respond to litigation without the intervention of a litigation friend. The right to litigate is a basic right protected by English law and safeguarded by the European Convention on Human Rights; it should only be restricted in limited circumstances.

Assessment and Evidence
If the court has the benefit of an expert assessment on capacity, the situation may be clear. However, if a parent declines professional assessment, it is for the court to determine the issue based on the best evidence available. It is highly unusual for the court to make a finding on capacity without any medical or psychological evidence. While the court may have some evidence, it may not be recent. The court will generally seek more current information, considering this both proportionate and necessary, as an opinion regarding capacity in one set of proceedings does not determine the issue in another. Lack of capacity should not be assumed.

In reviewing the evidence, the court must first identify an impairment or disturbance of the mind or brain (“the diagnostic test”) and then determine whether, because of this impairment or disturbance, the protected party cannot make the decisions necessary to conduct proceedings (“the functionality test”).
The court will also consider whether the parent has recently engaged with mental health services or receives assistance from adult social services. However, some parents have minimal involvement with such services and may have declined support. The court may invite the GP or other relevant professionals or agencies to assist in determining litigation capacity.

If no expert report can be obtained and the individual refuses or does not attend a medical or psychological examination, the court must consider what other evidence is available to help make its finding and should give appropriate directions.

Participation Directions
If the parent in question chooses to be directly involved in the proceedings, participation directions should be considered. These allow for adjustments throughout the proceedings to facilitate the parent’s involvement.

Stella Young
Trinity Chambers

The post Working with Parents Who Lack Capacity in Care Proceedings appeared first on Trinity Chambers.

Accredited journalists and legal bloggers have been able to attend, observe, hear and report on family court cases if a Transparency Order is granted. They can access some documents, quote participants, provided anonymity is preserved unless there are valid reasons for refusal. This follows a successful two-year pilot, leading to a nationwide roll-out at the end of 2024.

Journalists and legal bloggers may also request to speak to, as well as quote, people involved in the proceedings. The new open reporting provisions establish a presumption in favour of granting a Transparency Order, protecting the anonymity of children and their families, unless a legitimate reason exists to refuse it.

These provisions follow the success of the Family Court Reporting Pilot, launched in January 2023 and gradually implemented nationwide over the following two years.

The President of the Family Division Sir Andrew McFarlane [who is due to retire at Easter 2026] has described this as a “watershed moment for family Justice” emphasising the importance of improving public understanding and confidence in the Family Court. In October 2025 the President gave evidence to the house of Commons Parliamentary Justice committee regarding the reform of the Family Court. The President highlighted the significant steps taken towards greater transparency in the family courts:

‘You will know that we have opened up the court, and it is now part of business as usual that journalists can come in and report what goes on, without naming anybody. Being transparent is much more than simply letting journalists in; it is an attitude of mind. I have been prepared to go on the radio and give interviews to journalists in a way that judges probably have not before, because the public have a right to understand what we are doing on their behalf. I think being transparent will continue and continue to be something that needs to be looked at. I hope you all visit your local family courts. I hope I have encouraged all the local judges to ask their individual MPs to come in. I am sure MPs visit the local schools and local hospitals, so why not the local family court? Journalists should come into the local family court, not just to report a story—which of course they can—but to see what goes on and what makes it tick. We were called the secret family justice system or the secret family court, and I do not think that can be applied to us now. We do not want to be secret. That change has been a big one in my time.’

Aims of the key changes in the past year
The President has made clear that greater openness does not compromise privacy. The intention is to explain decisions in a manner that fosters public trust, involving not only the publication of judgments but also efforts to improve the clarity and accessibility of legal language used in those judgments. If a case falls under these provisions, parties will receive a Transparency Order outlining the reporting rules.

The Transparency Order allows for reporting of the case, but prohibits others from publishing information. It sets out what can and cannot be reported, and these rules must be strictly followed. All reported information will be anonymised to prevent identification of families, and sensitive information will remain private. Reporters require the judge’s permission, and only approved reporters may attend and report on hearings.

A reporter is either a journalist with a UK Press Card or a qualified legal blogger—typically a lawyer not involved in the case, belonging to a barristers’ chambers, law firm, or an organisation such as a university or charity, and able to verify their credentials.

Reporters may access certain basic documents such as case outlines, skeleton arguments, or position statements, to assist their understanding. Any request for additional documents must be approved by the judge.
Restrictions on Reporting

Transparency Orders specify what information may or may not be reported. Generally, reporters can describe the case details, documents, and hearing events, but cannot include:

• The names of children or family members involved
• The places where children live or attend school
• The dates of birth of any children

Additional restrictions may be imposed to prevent accidental identification, such as prohibiting the naming of social workers or foster carers. The rules are designed to ensure that even in the event of media coverage, those involved remain protected. Parties are not permitted to publish information about their own cases, including on social media, and must not share or react to media coverage. Breaching these restrictions may amount to an offence.
Judicial Discretion and Decision-Making
There should be a presumption that if a journalist or media blogger is present then Transparency Orders will be made unless there is a compelling reason not to. Parties may voice objections to reporting, but cannot opt out without the judge’s agreement. In making this decision, judges consider all circumstances, balancing specific concerns with the overarching goal of increasing transparency. The judge may:

• Grant the request and prohibit all reporting
• Modify the Transparency Order to further restrict what may be reported
• Maintain the existing Transparency Order
• Photographs of the individuals reported

It is important that parties only communicate with accredited reporters and legal bloggers, verifying credentials as necessary. Participants are not obliged to speak to reporters, and must not share restricted documents.
These reforms aim to make family courts more transparent and accountable without undermining privacy, especially in sensitive cases involving children.

Publication of Anonymised Judgments
Family court judges are now expected to publish anonymised written judgments more often. This increased publication enhances the quest for accountability, further adds to a public record of decision-making, promoting consistency, and helping both practitioners and families better understand how the law is applied in real cases. For my own part I truly welcome this as there still remains mystery and misunderstandings from the general public about how decisions are made and why, which is understandable bearing in mind the legal landscape. Where a journalist or legal blogger attends a hearing, it is good practice to record their name and contact details on the case management order. A template order can be downloaded form the Courts and tribunal Judiciary website.

Recent Case Example
I recently represented a Police Force seeking to vary the terms of a Transparency Order. Care proceedings had finalised. One of the parents was due to stand trial in relation to an allegation of murder of a child.
The court considered Part 12 of The Family Procedure Rule 2010 and Practice Direction 12R, 7.1 – 7.13 when considering whether to depart from the principle of transparency. In deciding on reporting restrictions, the court weighed the family’s rights to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the right to private and family life under Article 8 ECHR, and the rights of the press and public under Article 10 ECHR. After balancing these competing interests, the court varied the Transparency Order to allow publication of the name of the parent facing criminal trial and the deceased child therefore adjusting transparency according to the circumstances.

To date, I have encountered journalists primarily in cases allocated to the High Court rather than our local courts. This is understandable, given that the High Court handles more serious and complex matters, which tend to attract greater public interest.

Stella Young
Trinity Chambers

The post The Introduction of Open Reporting in Family Court appeared first on Trinity Chambers.

Wednesday, 24^th December from 8.30am to 12pm

Re-opening on Friday, 2^nd January 2026 at 8.30am

In case of emergency, please contact our out of hours numbers – 07981 195851

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a. There shall be provision by way of a pension sharing order as follows:
i. in favour of the respondent in respect of XX % of the applicant’s rights under The XXXX Plan.
ii. the costs of implementation to be shared XX in accordance with the pension sharing annex attached to this order.
b. There be the following consequential directions:
i. it being agreed between the parties that in the event that the respondent non-member spouse predeceases the applicant member spouse after this order has taken effect but before its implementation the applicant member spouse shall have the consent of the personal representatives of the respondent non-member spouse to apply to vary or to set aside the terms of this order under FPR 2010, r 9.9A or to appeal out of time against the order under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s 40A or s 40B (as shall in the circumstances be appropriate).
ii. Neither party shall apply for the final divorce order until 28 days after the making of the pension sharing order, but the respondent will make such application promptly thereafter.
iii. Both parties shall do all that is necessary to implement the pension sharing order promptly, including, but not limited to, the signing and returning of any documents related to the implementation promptly from a written request by any person properly concerned with the implementation process and paying promptly from a proper written request for the share of the fee ordered by the court and required by the pension arrangement to effect implementation.
iv. The applicant shall not intentionally claim, draw down, transfer or otherwise deal with any pension benefits subject to a pension sharing order in this order until the pension share so ordered has been implemented, save in the event of prior written agreement as between the parties.

The post New Pension Sharing Order Template appeared first on Trinity Chambers.

2. In recent times, numerous Court of Appeal decisions have addressed the concept of proportionality. Often, this principle is subtly embedded within different terminologies. However, the recent case of Re N directly confronts the common understanding of proportionality

3. Lord Justice Peter Jackson delivered the Judgment, he being no stranger to proportionality. The facts of Re N were perhaps a little different to so many of the care cases that we deal with. To keep the reader engaged the following bullet points sets out the factual matrix.

4. So here are the facts:-

• L, the subject child, was a boy of 2 years of age.
• The mother was a 57 year old Japanese national. She was a professional person, who lived and worked in this country for a number of years.
• In 2015 her husband died.
• The mother had no support from family in this country. She decided to have a child, and L was born in October 2023 after assisted conception overseas.
• The local authority became involved upon L’s birth. Nursing staff at the hospital felt that the mother was unable to care for him independently, and required prompting in areas of personal care and feeding
• When L was 3 weeks old, he and his mother went to what was the first of three separate placements which lasted for the next 21 months. The mother agreed to these placements under section 20 Children Act 1989 and no statutory order was made in respect of L until the final order conferred parental responsibility on the local authority.
• The final hearing took place between 11th and 15th August 2025 before Recorder Magennis.
• At final hearing the mother contested that the threshold criteria had been crossed for the making of public law orders but note that this was not a matter subject to the appeal.
• The court at first instance found that threshold was crossed on the likelihood of harm.
• The court then went on to make a Care Order and a Placement Order. The court of appeal quotes heavily from the judgment at first instance, and it is, time permitting, worthy of a read.
• The mother appealed (note new solicitors). None of the trial counsel appeared in the Appeal hearing.

5. The court having set out the facts (in a lot of detail all of which was required) Lord Justice Peter Jackson then considered the principles. As he said, “unusual cases prompt a return to first principles”.

Bullet points of those principles follow:-

• In Re B (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Threshold Criteria) [2013] UKSC 33; [2013] 1 WLR 1911, the Supreme Court confirmed that a care order can only be made if it is necessary in a democratic society for the protection of a child’s right to grow up free from harm, and proportionate to the needs of the situation.
• Y v United Kingdom (2012) 55 EHRR “ [F]amily ties may only be severed in very exceptional circumstances and that everything must be done to preserve personal relations and, where appropriate, to “rebuild” the family. It is not enough to show that a child could be placed in a more beneficial environment for his upbringing.”
• LJ Peter Jackson referred to the case of Re F (almost a classic now) whereby he said “I suggested that in assessing the risk of future harm, the court should consider: the type of harm that may arise; the likelihood of it arising; the severity of the consequences if it arose; and what risk reduction or mitigation steps can be taken.
• Back to the analysis of the court, LJ Peter Jackson said as follows “In Re B, in a finding upheld by the Supreme Court, the trial judge had expressed himself satisfied that the threshold had been crossed, “not perhaps in the most extreme way that is seen in some cases but crossed it has been”. That, in my view, is the situation here. The mother’s characteristics, unusual for a parent facing care proceedings in this country, led a number of professionals to express real concern about her parenting and her often dismissive response to guidance. These observations, coming from a range of experienced observers, had to be taken seriously, but they were not the end of the matter. The critical next question was whether the risks to L in early childhood, assessed in the light of whatever support might be effective, were so great as to justify the permanent dissolution of this small family.” As already mentioned, the findings of threshold were never appealed but it is helpful to read what the court of appeal’s view was on the issue. In short, not the most serve but the Rubicon was crossed.

7. The following passage from Lord Justice Peter Jackson is worth remembering. “The case for adoption was illustrated by a large number of small incidents and the generally dismissive parental reaction. No doubt the professionals were right and the mother was wrong about many of those matters, but the court needed to maintain a sense of proportion and keep the bigger picture in view. Adoption on the basis of evidence of this nature was an improbable outcome and it required particularly compelling justification. Reasoning of that kind is not to be found in the evidence or in the judgment and the orders in this case cannot therefore be upheld.”.

8. So, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. But why and what were the conclusions we can take from this case. Again, hats off to the court for giving me some fuel for future submissions. This is what LJ Peter Jackson said :-

• “In the first place, this was a case of the kind referred to in Re B where “the feared harm has not yet materialised and may never do so”. Despite the presence of another adult, the mother had been L’s primary carer for nearly two years, during which no harm, still less significant harm, had come to him. That factor had to be taken into account when the court was considering future risks. However, the recorder made no reference to it in the passage cited” AND “In L’s case, even if he came by additional accidents due to his mother’s inattention to risk, there is no reason to believe that the consequences of individual events would be worse for him than for any other child. In accepting the ISW’s assessment of risk, the recorder unduly elevated the significance of this element of the welfare checklist.”
•  “The second difficulty concerns the recorder’s approach to possible measures of support. It is true that the mother had reacted poorly to direct parenting advice. At the same time, her case was that she wanted to work, and that she would employ a nanny or childminder. L is already at an age when he could be at a nursery and in due course he will go to school. The recorder did not explore the obvious possible benefits of these foreseeable arrangements, but instead simply accepted the view of Ms Harold that effective support (i.e. 24/7) could not be offered: see [89] at paragraph 19 above. However, there was no reason to think that round-the-clock support was needed or would be needed indefinitely, or that the mother, who had voluntarily accepted extensive limitations on her freedom of action for nearly two years, would not abide by reasonable conditions in future, whatever she might personally think of them.”
•  “The mother’s lack of insight into professional concerns was relevant, but its significance very much depended on the nature and validity of the concerns themselves, and on the extent to which effective protection might depend on insight, as opposed to other measures.”

9. I think Re N is a helpful reminder to all practitioners that a linear approach to cases is not helpful. Too often we are faced with evidence of risk of harm that just gets over the threshold criteria. In cases involving young children, with no support networks, how often are parents faced with care plans for adoption? Often there is a gaping hole in the analysis, where the Re F factors are forgotten or marginally considered but given the cold shoulder. Or else, we get the inevitable oral evidence from the social worker that “ the parents will need to have 24 hour supervision” As quoted above “the court needed to maintain a sense of proportion and keep the bigger picture in view.” Although the facts of Re N are unusual, I am pleased that the Court of Appeal had an opportunity to deal with a case like this whereby the feared harm had not happened and might not materialise.

William Green
Trinity Chambers.

The post Re N (A Child Placement Order: Proportionality) [2025] EWCA Civ 1541 appeared first on Trinity Chambers.

For anyone who would like to revisit the material, a link to the slides is included below. Do look out for the third seminar in the months to come!

Navigating the Fixed Recoverable Costs Regime

The post Navigating the Fixed Recoverable Costs Regime appeared first on Trinity Chambers.

The appeal by the father, represented by Mr Sullivan, against final care orders made at the Issues Resolution Hearing was allowed by the Court of Appeal. The judgment provided clarification on the matters to be taken into account by the court when considering making final orders at IRH or whether a final hearing is required.

Full judgement available at  https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Re-H-Final-Care-Orders-at-IRH.pdf

The post Re H (Final Care Orders at IRH) [2025] EWCA Civ 1342 appeared first on Trinity Chambers.

Proportionality lies at the heart of contemporary legal reasoning. Article 6 and Article 8 of ECHR provides the principle that the state can only interfere in a manner proportionate to the risk of harm. Article 6 of the ECHR guarantees the right to a fair trial. This includes the requirement that any limitations on this right must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Article 8 of the ECHR protects the right to respect for private and family life, home, and correspondence. Any interference with these rights by a public authority must be necessary in a democratic society and proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, such as national security, public safety, or the economic well-being of the country.

What Is Proportionality?

Proportionality has been described as the ultimate rule of law.  At its core, proportionality asks whether the means used to achieve a legitimate objective are necessary and whether they impose an undue burden on the rights or interests of individuals.

Historical Development

The concept of proportionality has deep roots. Its intellectual origins are often traced to German (Prussian) administrative law, where it developed as a control on state power. In German administrative law, the Principle of Proportionality (Verhältnismäßigkeit) is a fundamental concept requiring that administrative actions be necessary, suitable, and proportionate in a narrow sense to the aims they pursue, ensuring that government measures do not use excessive means for their goals.

The Allgemeines Landrecht of 1794 granted the government the authority to exercise police powers to ensure public peace. However, it simultaneously restricted these powers to only those measures that were essential for achieving that goal. The article specified that the police were to “take the necessary measures for the maintenance of public peace, security, and order.” This would have marked the first textual basis for the requirement of proportionality. Note, that the American constitution went down the route of “balancing” as opposed to proportionality and there is an interesting article online titled “American balancing and German proportionality: The historical origins” by Moshe Cohen-Eliya* and Iddo Porat.

Proportionality in Care Proceedings

In B (A Child) [2013] UKSC 33 Lord Neuberger in the Supreme Court emphasised that a care order where the plan is for adoption is a proportionate response to the harm identified. Lord Neuberger described such an order as ‘a last resort’ and expressed the view that ‘before making an adoption order in such a case, the court must be satisfied that there is no practical way of the authorities (or others) providing the requisite assistance and support’.

In giving a dissenting judgment, Lady Hale in the same case said this on the topic of proportionality “Thus it is not surprising that Lewison LJ was troubled by the proportionality of planning the most drastic interference possible, which is a closed adoption, in a case where the threshold had not been crossed in the most extreme way (see para 174 above). However, I would not see proportionality in such a linear fashion, as if the level of interference should be in direct proportion to the level of harm to the child. There are cases where the harm suffered or feared is very severe, but it would be disproportionate to sever or curtail the family ties because the authorities can protect the child in other ways. I recall, for example, a case where the mother was slowly starving her baby to death because she could not cope with the colostomy tube through which the baby had to be fed, but solutions were found which enabled the child to stay at home. Conversely, there may be cases where the level of harm is not so great, but there is no other way in which the child can be properly protected from it”.

She further went on to say (and this was pre- Re B-S) “Nevertheless, it is quite clear that the test for severing the relationship between parent and child is very strict: only in exceptional circumstances and where motivated by overriding requirements pertaining to the child’s welfare, in short, where nothing else will do. In many cases, and particularly where the feared harm has not yet materialised and may never do so, it will be necessary to explore and attempt alternative solutions. As was said in Re C and B [2001] 1 FLR 611, at para 34.”

In the case of H-W (Children) a Supreme Court case from 2022, Dame Siobhan Keegan gave the lead judgment. She said of proportionality :-

“Intervention in the family may be appropriate, but the aim should be to reunite the family when the circumstances enable that, and the effort should be devoted towards that end. Cutting off all contact and the relationship between the child or children and their family is only justified by the overriding necessity of the interests of the child.”

“The effect of a care order is to vest parental responsibility for the child in the local authority: section 33 Children Act 1989. Thereafter, the parents can exercise their parental responsibility only to the extent that the local authority determines. As this court explained in In re B, that intrusive power clearly engages the article 8 rights of the parents and children. It follows that a care order can only be made, even if the statutory threshold criteria under section 31(2) are met, if such an order is necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the child(ren)’s right to grow up free from harm. That means that the order can be made only if it is proportionate to the needs of the situation.”

What does ‘proportionate to the needs of the situation’ mean? This concept is similar to the issues addressed by Lady Hale in Re B. The importance of risk assessment by the courts, as seen in Re F (A Child) (Placement Order: Proportionality) and more recently Re T (Children: Risk Assessment) EWCA Civ 93[1], compels the court to consider the likelihood of harm and how it can be prevented or protected against. This assessment informs the court on whether making a care or placement order is indeed proportionate, given the identified risk factors.

Dame Keegen went on to quote from Re B-S (Children) (Adoption Order: Leave to Oppose) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146; which in turn quoted from McFarlane LJ (as he then was) in In re G (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Welfare Evaluation) [2013] EWCA Civ 965; [2013] 3 FCR 293:

“The judicial task is to evaluate all the options, undertaking a global, holistic and multi-faceted evaluation of the child’s welfare which takes into account all the negatives and the positives, all the pros and cons, of each option …

‘What is required is a balancing exercise in which each option is evaluated to the degree of detail necessary to analyse and weigh its own internal positives and negatives and each option is then compared, side by side, against the competing option or options.’

As Dame Keegen stated “This is now rightly the accepted standard for the manner in which a contemplated child protection order must be tested against the requirement that it be necessary and proportionate”.

Presently, the test for proportionality seems to be well settled. However, as we know as practitioners, things change, and attitudes and opinions move with the times. Do you always feel that the decision of the court is proportionate?

William Green

Trinty Chambers.

1. (1)What type of harm has arisen and might arise?

(2) How likely is it to arise?

(3) What would be the consequences for the child if it did?

(4) To what extent might the risks be reduced or managed?

(5) What other welfare considerations have to be taken into account?

(6) In consequence, which of the realistic plans best promotes the child’s welfare?

(7) If the preferred plan involves interference with the Article 8 rights of the child or

of others, is that necessary and proportionate?”

The post May I introduce you to Proportionality: Balancing Rights and Responsibilities in Law appeared first on Trinity Chambers.