We have eight individuals ranked in Family: Children & Domestic Abuse and six in Family: Divorce & Financial Remedy.

Family: Children & Domestic Abuse
Stefanie Wickins
Daniel Attridge
Alice Newton
Emily Quinn
William Green
Lisa Tuckwell
Laura-Jayne Swaile
Hannah Sutton

Family: Divorce & Financial Remedy
Stefanie Wickins
Tina Harrington
Andrew Bailey
Daniel Attridge
Alice Newton
Emily Quinn

The post Legal 500, 2027 appeared first on Trinity Chambers.

The decision builds upon Lumb v NHS Humber and North Yorkshire ICB & Anor [2024] EWCOP 57 (T2), in which Senior Judge Hilder held, in the context of NHS direct payments, their management may involve welfare decision-making falling outside a property and affairs deputy’s general authority.

The issue in the present case was whether that reasoning applied across other statutory direct payment schemes. The applications concerned four statutory direct payment regimes; namely, the National Health Service (Direct Payments) Regulations 2013, the Care and Support (Direct Payments) Regulations 2014, the Special Educational Needs (Personal Budgets) Regulations 2014 and the Community Care, Services of Carers and Children’s Services (Direct Payments) (England) Regulations 2009.

The seven applications were brought by professional deputies who were already managing direct payments and who challenged Lumb’s conclusion that such management involved welfare decision-making, while seeking prospective and, where necessary, retrospective authority to continue doing so.

HHJ Hilder rejected the deputies’ argument. The management of direct payments is a distinct function falling outside the general authority of a property and affairs deputy. Specific authority to undertaken such management is required from the CoP, to encompass both property and affairs and welfare decision-making.

The critical distinction was between the mere administration of money and decisions as to how P’s care and support needs should be met. Direct payments are intended to facilitate choice; deciding that they are an appropriate means of meeting P’s needs, and how they should be deployed, therefore involves welfare decision-making. HHJ Hilder accordingly held that the reasoning in Lumb was not confined to NHS Personal Health Budgets but applied across the four schemes before the Court.

The judgment also addresses deputies who have historically managed direct payments without specific authority. Recognising the established practice, HHJ Hilder adopted a pragmatic approach to retrospective authorisation, including a backstop date of 11 October 2024, the date of the decision in Lumb.

Practically, deputies managing direct payments should review the scope of their existing authority. Future applications will require evidence addressing P’s care and support needs, the funding arrangements, alternatives to deputy management and why deputy involvement is in P’s best interests.
The decision therefore confirms that managing direct payments is not merely an incident of property and affairs deputyship: where it entails decisions as to the meeting of P’s care and support needs, specific Court of Protection authority is required.

The key points for practitioners are therefore:
1. general property and affairs authority does not, without more, authorise a deputy to manage direct payments;
2. management of direct payments involves both property and affairs and welfare elements, requiring specific Court of Protection authority where undertaken within deputyship;
3. the reasoning in Lumb is not confined to NHS Personal Health Budgets but applies across the direct payment schemes considered in this case; and
4. existing deputies managing direct payments should review their authority and consider whether prospective and/or retrospective authorisation is required.

Teia Yule

The post Re Various Applications in respect of ‘Direct Payments’ [2026] EWCOP 42 (T2) appeared first on Trinity Chambers.

The question in R v P was whether the court was right to terminate the father’s application for contact with G at a one-hour directions hearing which followed a fact-finding hearing, making an order which limited him to indirect contact and imposing a restriction on the making of further applications pursuant to section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989.

The court confirmed that there was power to terminate the father’s application for contact as was previously re-affirmed in the Court of Appeal in Re A, B and C (Child Arrangements: Final Order At Dispute Resolution Appointment) [2025] EWCA Civ 55, where Baker LJ considered the court’s ability to make a non-consensual order at a Dispute Resolution Appointment (‘DRA’) and summarised the position at [44] as follows:

“Even where the parties are unable to reach an agreement, the court has the
power to bring the proceedings to an end if satisfied that such a course is
consistent with the welfare of the children, which under s.1 of the 1989 Act is
the paramount consideration whenever the court is determining any question
about the children’s upbringing”

In support of that conclusion, Baker LJ referred to the judgment of Sir James Munby, P
in Re C (Children) (Residence Order: Application being dismissed at the Fact
Finding Stage) [2012] EWCA Civ 1489, where the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal
against a judge’s decision reached after an abbreviated hearing of the evidence. The
former President observed:

“14. … It has long been recognised – and authority need not be quoted for this
proposition – that for this reason a judge exercising the family jurisdiction has
a much broader discretion than he would in the civil jurisdiction to determine
the way in which an application of the kind being made by the father should be
pursued. In an appropriate case he can summarily dismiss the application as
being, if not groundless, lacking enough merit to justify pursuing the matter. He
may determine that the matter is one to be dealt with on the basis of written
evidence and oral submissions without the need for oral evidence. He may, as
Judge Cliffe did in the present case, decide to hear the evidence of the applicant
and then take stock of where the matter stands at the end of the evidence.

15. The judge in such a situation will always be concerned to ask himself: is
there some solid reason in the interests of the children why I should embark
upon, or, having embarked upon, why I should continue exploring the matters
which one or other of the parents seeks to raise. If there is or may be solid
advantage in the children in doing so, then the inquiry will proceed, albeit it
may be on the basis of submissions rather than oral evidence. But if the judge is
satisfied that no advantage to the children is going to be obtained by continuing
the investigation further, then it is perfectly within his case management powers
and the proper exercises of his discretion so to decide and to determine that the
proceedings should go no further.
…
18. It is pre-eminently a matter for the trial judge in a case of this sort to
determine the form of procedure which will best meet the welfare needs of the
children. A judge is not obliged, merely because one parent or the other wishes
him to do so, to listen to evidence if it has become apparent to him that the
process is not going to be of any advantage to the children. That was the view
Judge Cliffe took. It was a robust view, but it is quite impossible, in my
judgment, to assert that the judge, in taking that view and adopting that
approach, exceeded the generous ambit of discretion which the law conferred
upon him as the trial judge.”

Back to the case in hand, Mr Justice Harrison went through the background to the case, which will not be set out here. One interesting point: the judge at first instance directed the mother and the father to file statements of evidence limited to 5 pages, setting out their response to the court’s findings of fact. This is what Mr Justice Harrison had to say about this course of action “ In accordance with the judge’s directions, each of the parties filed short statements responding to the fact-finding judgment. Although I have not heard argument on this specific issue, I have some reservations about the utility of this course. If, in the aftermath of a judgment, a party files a statement accepting all of a judge’s findings against them, this must surely give rise to questions about whether that acceptance is sincere or whether it has merely been proffered to appease the court. For the father to come to a genuine acceptance of findings made about his conduct is likely to require more than the filing of a statement and to entail some form of specialist work.”

Of note, both the court at first instance and the appeal court found the father’s statement to say one thing but mean another. Ie, the court took the view that the father was not really accepting the findings, despite having asserted that he did. The father’s appeal was effectively that the court’s decision on the contact application was procedurally irregular and wrong.

Ultimately, despite sympathy for the mother’s submissions, the court allowed the appeal. The reasons for allowing the appeal were multifaceted, but if I may draw from one of the conclusions from the judgment. At paragraph 69 of the judgment, the court said as follows “I am unable to accept Ms Whelan’s submission to the effect that the court should not waste its resources for the benefit of a father who has refused to accept its findings. It must not be forgotten that whatever faults he may have as a father, it is the child who has a right to have a relationship with him, provided it can safely be achieved. She, and not the father, is the court’s focus. The court should not lightly cast aside the long-term significance for her welfare of growing up without any meaningful relationship with her father or potentially even knowledge of him”

In short, although the court has the power to conclude matters at a DRA hearing, on this occasion, for the reasons set out in the Judgment of the court, this approach was approved of on the facts of the case.

William Green
Trinity Chambers

The post R v P (Appeal: Dismissal of Private Law Proceedings at Directions Hearing) Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2215 (Fam) appeared first on Trinity Chambers.

The Be The Ladder Awards celebrate individuals and organisations who act as “ladders” for others – helping people to overcome barriers, realise their potential and achieve success. The Empowerment Ladder specifically recognises those who give others the tools, skills or confidence to climb higher. The awards seek to encourage a wider culture of paying it forward, inclusion and creating opportunities for others.

Yaa’s selection is particularly fitting given her longstanding commitment to supporting others within and beyond the legal profession. Alongside her practice as a family law barrister, Yaa serves as Vice Chair of the Bar Council’s Young Barristers’ Committee and as a Social Mobility Advocate for the Bar Council. Through these and other professional roles, she contributes to supporting junior barristers, widening opportunity and encouraging those from different backgrounds to see the Bar as a profession in which they can succeed.

Yaa has spoken publicly about her own route to the profession and the importance of lawyers as catalysts for change. That commitment to creating opportunities and encouraging others to progress strongly reflects the ethos at the heart of the Empowerment Ladder award.

The winners will be announced at the Be The Ladder Awards ceremony on Friday 6 November 2026 at the Underglobe, beneath Shakespeare’s Globe in London.

We warmly congratulate Yaa on this well-deserved recognition and wish her every success at the awards ceremony.

Find out more about the Be The Ladder Awards

The post Yaa Dankwa Ampadu-Sackey named Empowerment Ladder Finalist at the Be The Ladder Awards 2026 appeared first on Trinity Chambers.

Applications for occupation orders excluding one party from the property often arise alongside disputes concerning the children. Whilst any decision regarding interim child arrangements within such proceedings must apply the paramountcy principle and conduct a welfare analysis, Poole J outlined the distinction in Family Law Act (FLA) proceedings, where the Court’s consideration is focused on any child’s health, safety and well-being when granting an occupation order which consequently requires a change in child arrangements. The CA statutory framework is not applicable in FLA proceedings; the Court is to consider any child’s welfare through s33, specifically their health, safety and well-being.

The potential impact of an occupation order on interim child arrangments is not unusual. The issue before Poole J was whether the trial judge had erred in law through his failure to apply the paramountcy principle and his failure to conduct an analysis of the welfare checklist in the FLA proceedings when as a consequence of granting an occupation order, the child arrangements order had to be altered in the interim. Poole J rejected this proposition.

The judgment succinctly outlines the applicable considerations when the Court is faced with tackling the interplay between occupation orders and interim child arrangements, in that:

1. ‘If it appeared to the court that the applicant or any relevant child would be likely to suffer significant harm attributable to the conduct of the respondent if an order under s33(7) were not made, the balance of significant harm under s33(7)(a) and (b); or,

2. If it as found that s33(7) was not applicable, how the revised child arrangements would affect the health, safety or well-being of the parties and of any relevant child and any other relevant circumstances under ss33(6) including s33(6)(c).’ at [31].

The proceedings concerned an occupation order application under the FLA, which arose in the context of the parties’ separation, with concurrent financial remedy proceedings and CA proceedings concerning A and B. At the time of determination of the FLA application, the financial remedy proceedings were listed for final determination some three weeks later, and final determination of the CA proceedings was listed for just over two months later. Both parties and the children were residing in the home under a partial nesting arrangement which had been in place since September 2025, underpinned by an interim child arrangements order. For the most part, both parents resided in the home, but for defined periods, one would leave and reside in a hotel funded by F, so that the other could spend time alone with the children.

M’s application was for an occupation order excluding F from the home entirely. The trial judge was assisted by evidence from M, F and the allocated social worker. Her evidence was plain that the parents continuing to cohabit was harmful to both children and the parental conflict, ongoing proceedings and Local Authority involvement were particularly having a significant impact on A’s emotional wellbeing. The allocated social worker concluded that ‘a change in circumstance within the family environment is vital’ and the children being caught in the middle of parental conflict was the most harmful factor in the children’s lives.

The family had significant means, with there being no concerns about financing alternative accommodation.

Against this backdrop, Poole J was required to determine whether the trial judge had properly considered the children and the impact on the interim child arrangements, and whether that consideration had been in accordance with the requisite test.

Poole J’s judgment is clear that the Court is not bound to consider the paramountcy principle or conduct a welfare analysis in accordance with s1(3) of the CA in the confines of FLA proceedings when any such order would have a direct effect on existing child arrangements. The appropriate consideration in this context is centred around either the balance of significant harm under s33(7)(a) and (b) or any effect of the revised arrangements on the health, safety and well-being of the parties or any relevant child. This approach provides a distinct focus within FLA proceedings.

Poole J took the view that the trial judge had correctly considered all of the circumstances, including the impact on the well-being of the children. He heard the strong evidence of the allocated social worker, that the harm these children were suffering as a direct result of their current living arrangements, along with her recommendation that the family environment needed to change. He had considered whether the occupation order, and therefore the consequential change of child arrangements, was in the best interests of the children. The trial judge had found that it was ‘patently obvious’ that the current arrangements were disruptive for A and B, and the conflictual environment needed to end. He also noted that a continuation of the nesting arrangement, in any form, would risk causing emotional harm to M.

KM v LN is helpful in directing the Court’s considerations towards any impact on child arrangements orders within FLA proceedings. The well-being of any child involved must be considered within the context of the FLA framework, rather than by treating welfare as the paramount consideration under the Children Act 1989.

The full judgment can be accessed here: https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewhc/fam/2026/2123?from_date=2026-01-01&to_date=2026-08-13&court=ewca%2Fciv&court=ewhc%2Ffam&court=ewfc

Teia Yule

The post KM v LN (Appeal: Occupation Order and Interim Child Arrangements) [2026] EWHC 2123 (Fam) (7 August 2026) appeared first on Trinity Chambers.

Katherine will continue to accept instructions in all areas of law, as well as civil work (including possession hearings and small claims trials).

Katherine was formally a court usher at Cambridge County Court before commencing her pupillage at Chambers in 2025.

Congratulations, Katherine!

The post Katherine Watson joins Trinity Chambers as a tenant appeared first on Trinity Chambers.

Cohabitation Powerpoint

The post Slides from the presentation: Common Law Marriage: A Guide to current MCA Legislation and cohabitation reforms appeared first on Trinity Chambers.

MacDonald J has provided welcome clarification that, in family proceedings, the ordinary procedure remains that a witness who volunteers to give evidence from abroad may do so directly by video-link without invoking the Hague Convention 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Proceedings.

The practice of giving evidence by video-link from abroad has been long-established in family proceedings. The issue before MacDonald J was whether this practice required compliance with the Hague Convention procedure whenever a witness volunteered to give evidence from another jurisdiction. MacDonald J rejected that proposition.

The judgment establishes four propositions of practical propositions:

1. voluntary evidence may ordinarily be received by video-link;
2. the Hague Convention is not mandatory;
3. the consent from the foreign state is not ordinarily required; and
4. different considerations arise where the witness must be compelled.

The proceedings concerned a financial remedy application under the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984. They arose in the context of the husband’s designation under the United Kingdom’s sanctions regime. Consequently, he was prohibited from entering or remaining in the United Kingdom and was subject to an asset freeze. He contended that these restrictions prevented his attendance at trial and deprived him of the means to arrange appropriate private security should he be required to travel to this jurisdiction. Although he was simultaneously engaged in commercial proceedings and previously engaged in First-tier Tribunal proceedings, no provision had been made for him to give evidence remotely from Russia.
Prior to the hearing, enquiries were directed to the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office’s Taking of Evidence Team pursuant to FPR PD22A. The response incorrectly advised that the Russian Federation was not a Contracting State to the Hague Convention and that the husband would therefore be required to proceed by way of a Letter of Request. An application was made on that basis.

Against that background, MacDonald J was required to determine the appropriate procedural mechanism by which the husband should give evidence. The judgment addresses a question of considerable practical importance: whether, in family proceedings, a witness who voluntarily agrees to give evidence by video-link from abroad must first comply with the procedures prescribed by the Hague Convention.

The Court answered that question firmly in the negative. MacDonald J distinguished the immigration authorities of Nare (Evidence by Electronic Means) Zimbabwe [2011] UKUT 00443 (IAC) and Agbabiaka (Evidence from Abroad; Nare Guidance) Nigeria [2021] UKUT 286 (IAC) previously considered appropriate in SA v AA [2023] EWHC 2016 (Fam). It was held that those decisions arose within a different statutory and procedural context and did not reflect the long-established practice of the Family Division. They, therefore, are not applicable to remote evidence in family proceedings.

This decision will be welcomed by family practitioners since it removes the uncertainty previously in existence of the approach and confirms the long-established practice in family proceedings. The impact of this approach is that is avoids unnecessary delay and expense where evidence can properly be taken via video-link.
Departing from newly established ordinary position, MacDonald J indicated that the Hague Convention should be utilised when a witness does not volunteer to give evidence via video-link from abroad and need to be compelled. Similarly, it was suggested that the Hague Convention should be utilised when, despite the witness volunteering to give evidence, there is a need for formal identification of such witness or when taking action for contempt or perjury.

Potanina is now likely to become the leading authority on the ordinary approach to voluntary video evidence from abroad in family proceedings. It provides certainty in the approach whilst preserving sufficient flexibility where compulsion or comity concerns arise.

The decision is another illustration of the Family Division’s pragmatic approach to remote participation following the widespread adoption of video hearings since the pandemic.

Although the judgment simplifies domestic procedure, it leaves unresolved the practical consequences should a foreign state regard the taking of evidence as contrary to its domestic law.

The full judgment can be accessed here: https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewhc/fam/2026/1738

Teia Yule

The post Potanina v Potanin (No.3) (Video Evidence from Abroad) [2026] EWHC 1738 (Fam) (14 July 2026) appeared first on Trinity Chambers.

2. The final hearing of the case in the County Court was segmented for a number of reasons, resulting in two separate judgments. On appeal, those judgments were treated as a single judgment.

3. The parents were from Pakistan. The parents’ immigration status was described as precarious. The concerns of the local authority concerned domestic abuse, injuries to one of the children and parental dishonesty.

4. For various reasons, the first final hearing was treated as a threshold hearing only. The court made findings, and these were not subject to appeal.

5. A welfare hearing took place between 16-20 March 2026. The Local Authority, supported by the Children’s Guardian, sought a care and placement order. The hearing did not achieve its intended purpose. By the end, the judge was not satisfied that the analysis undertaken by the local authority and the Guardian conformed with the requirements of Re B-S. However, the Judge did give a substantial judgment dealing with the issue of risk.

6. The third hearing took place in May 2026, the judge having heard further evidence and submissions. The Judgment that followed approved the local authority plan for adoption.

7. The mother appealed on two grounds, firstly, that the making of a Care and Placement order was not necessary and proportionate and secondly, that the Judge’s welfare evaluation was procedurally flawed and amounted to a linear rather than a holistic assessment of the realistic options.

8. LJ Peter Jackson dismissed the second ground of appeal. However, and in saying “I have not found this an entirely easy appeal”, LJ Peter Jackson did allow the appeal on the second ground.

9. The Judge referred to Re H-W (Children) [2022] UKSC 17 as well as the absolute classic text from Hedley J in Re L (Care: Threshold Criteria) [2007] 1 FLR 2050.

10. LJ Peter Jackson went on to say: Taking all these matters into account, my conclusion is that, despite unanimous professional advice and the care that she evidently took, the judge’s welfare assessment fell short in two linked ways. The first is that there was an insufficient focus on the realistically likely consequences for these children of such harm as they were likely to suffer in maternal or parental care. The second was that there was an insufficient recognition of the potential ability of the state to support these children within their family by means of a combination of:

(i) supervisory or coercive measures under s.31 of the Children Act 1989
(ii) a Domestic Abuse Protection Order (DAPO) under the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, which can exist without limit of time and breach of which is a criminal offence;
(iii) any voluntary interventions by local authority support services and by other agencies working with the parents, who might (if properly briefed) add another layer of vigilance.

11. To that end, my favourite line in the judgement is as follows: “It is a disappointing, even bleak, conclusion that the child protection system could contribute nothing towards increasing the safety of the children of this unreliable but otherwise able victim of domestic abuse.”

12. About proportionality, the Judge also noted that “The judge was also right to look at the totality of the risks, but again the court must always maintain a sense of proportion and base its risk assessment on conclusions that can fairly spring from the evidence.” Further, “The judge vividly acknowledged most aspects of this certain and significant harm, for example in the May judgment at [70], but despite repeated readings of the judgments I cannot identify why she considered that it was so outweighed by the future risks as to make permanent separation and adoption necessary. If she considered that any undetected resumption of domestic abuse would be unacceptable, that would be disproportionate. As Hedley J said, some children will experience disadvantage and harm and, as I put it in Re T, risk assessment is not about the elimination of all risks.”

13. This case nicely sets out the importance of the court analysing risk, the likelihood of the risk and its consequences for the children. Importantly, how can that risk be reduced or managed?

14. The court must then consider other welfare factors and determine which realistic plan best meets the child’s needs. Of course, if the plan interferes with the child’s Article 8 rights, are the orders sought necessary and proportionate?

Will Green

The post F (Children: Placement Orders: Proportionality) [2026] EWCA Civ 990 appeared first on Trinity Chambers.

Appointment to the Attorney General’s Panel follows a highly competitive selection process and recognises excellence in advocacy, legal ability and professional standing.

Yaa Dankwa is an accomplished family law barrister whose practice encompasses all areas of family law. This prestigious appointment is a testament to her skill, dedication and commitment to the highest standards of advocacy.

We congratulate Yaa Dankwa on this well-deserved achievement and wish her every success in this important public appointment.

Yaa Dankwa continues to accept instructions across all areas of her family law practice from Chambers. To instruct her, please contact the Chambers’ clerks.

The post Yaa Dankwa Ampadu-Sackey appointed to the Attorney General’s London Civil Panel C appeared first on Trinity Chambers.