This recognition reflects the quality, expertise and commitment of our barristers and staff, and we are grateful to our clients and professional colleagues for their continued confidence in Chambers.

The awards ceremony will take place on 22 September 2026 at the Park Plaza Westminster Bridge, London.

At Trinity Chambers, we are committed to delivering first-class advocacy and practical legal solutions. We welcome instructions from solicitors, businesses, public bodies, and private clients seeking experienced counsel across our practice areas.

To discuss a case or an instruction, please contact our clerking team at clerks@trinitychambers.com

Thank you to everyone who has contributed to this achievement, and congratulations to all those shortlisted.

Keith Willmore
Chief Clerk

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The court heard three separate appeals, each relating to the attribution of parental responsibility and the status of ‘father’ with respect to a child. For me the most interesting and knotty was the third appeal in respect of Re P so I have reversed the order and dealt with that case first.

The questions posed for the SC (paragraph 2)

The Re M and Re J cases raised the following basic questions:

i) Is the definition of ‘father’ for the purposes of Children Act 1989 [‘CA
1989’] limited to a child’s biological/genetic father, or may it extend to
others who have acted as the child’s psychological/social father?

The short answer is no.

ii) Where an individual is registered as a child’s ‘father’ in their birth
register entry, does parental responsibility attributed by such registration
attach to a ‘father’ who is not, in fact, the biological/genetic father of
that child?

Again, the short answer is no.

iii) If, in response to (ii), parental responsibility is afforded to a non-
biological father, is it automatically terminated upon the making of a
declaration that the individual is not the child’s father under Family Law
Act 1986, s 55A [‘FLA 1986’], or does the attribution of parental
responsibility continue unless and until it is terminated by a separate CA
1989 court order?

And another short answer – it was never acquired notwithstanding the entry on the birth of certificate.

iv) If, in response to (iii), a separate court order is required to terminate
parental responsibility in such circumstances, is this a decision to be
determined by affording paramount consideration to the child’s welfare,
or on some other basis?

And in light of (iii) the answer is no.

“The third case, which, in common with the first two, raised the question of
parental responsibility attributed following the naming of an individual as
‘father’ in a birth register entry, had an additional level of complexity arising
from the fact that the mother had engaged in sexual intercourse with each of two
identical male twins in the course of one week at the time that conception must
have occurred. As a result, whilst DNA testing establishes that the child’s
biological father is one of these twins, it is not possible to say which of them it
is.”

In this case the decision was to make an order termination parental responsibility as it could not be said he was not the father; which would be a pre-requisite for removal from the register.

Re P: the factual context

In the third case, P was the elder of two children before the court in private law proceedings at the time of the child’s birth the mother had been in a relationship with TP1 (who was a twin of TP2); and TP1 was registered on the birth certificate as her father.. When the relationship between M and TP1 broke down the question arose as to which of the brothers was the biological father the court having found that as they had each engaged in sexual intercourse with the mother within a four day period in the. month that P was conceived. The DNA showed that each of them could be the father, court unsurprisingly found that there was a 50/50 chance of each of the brothers being her father. The court at first instance left the issue of parental responsibility to the higher court aware of pending appeals on the issue.

On appeal to the CA the mother was aligned with TP2, the court at first instance had made orders that shared the care of P between the 3 adults; but had decided that could not conclude that the registration of TP1 as the father was wrong.

The CA found that “whilst the position that has been reached means that TP1 will remain as ‘father ‘in the birth register entry, the question of the continuation of parental responsibility is a separate issue. The court retains the power to terminate any parental responsibility that has been acquired, or in this case may have been acquired, by s 4(1), by making an order discharging parental responsibility under s 4(2A).”

At paragraph 96 the court said “the situation resulting from the judge’s order and this court’s determination on the principal issue is that if TP1 is the legal father he has parental responsibility, but if he is not he does not, yet it cannot be said whether he is or is not the legal. father. That outcome is not in P’s best interests and is contrary to her overall welfare. It is understandable that the judge left the disentanglement of the legal issue to this court (when it was known that the other appeals were to be heard). With the benefit of the hindsight now achieved as to the definition of father, in my view it was wrong for the court not to achieve clarity by discharging any parental responsibility that TP1 may have had by making an order under CA 1989, s 4(2A). The basis for discharging parental responsibility is, firstly, that, as he is not proved to be the father, TP1 should not have been registered as ‘father’ and he is not a candidate for the acquisition of parental responsibility under s 4(1). Secondly, it is plainly not in P’s welfare interests for this ambiguity as to parental responsibility to continue an order will be made under CA 1989, s 4(2A) that any. parental responsibility that TP1 may have acquired under s 4(1) by registration as ‘father’ in P’s birth register entry shall cease from the date of this court’s order and any further order that may be made following additional submissions in that case relating to ‘welfare’.

In the other two of cases, the status of an individual who had been registered as ‘father’ in a child’s birth register entry was subsequently challenged. In one case the genuine assumption that the individual was the biological father of the child was found to be wrong, in the other it had always been known that he was not the biological father, but in both cases the individuals had acted as a psychological or social father to the child and both did so believing that they shared parental responsibility with the child’s mother as a result of being registered as ‘father’ on the birth register entry.”

Re J

In the first case where the named father believed he was the natural father the court found that (paragraph 34) (b) as AJ was not J’s father, he was not eligible to be registered as ‘father’ in J’s birth register entry;

c) No legal or practical difficulty had been identified in holding that a false, but genuine, understanding that an individual had held parental responsibility was void ab initio. In particular, any parental acts undertaken by such an individual would legitimately come within the authorisation provided by CA 1989, s 3(5);

d) AJ did not, therefore, acquire parental responsibility upon being named as J’s father in the birth register entry and, consequently, he has never held parental responsibility for J;

e) Accordingly, no order was required to remove parental
responsibility from him.

Re M

In the second case the father new he was not the father as the parents had bought sperm on the internet as a consequence; he was not afforded the same status as he would have been if using a licenced clinic. Though the legal process was slightly different in that the mother had applied for a declaration of non-paternity; the court held that as a result of the declaration of non-paternity, any parental responsibility that AM had held for M would be lost. In the alternative, on the facts and applying the welfare principle, if an order under s 4(2A) removing parental responsibility was required, she would have made such an order.

The conclusion of the court (paragraph 80) was “referring to the list of questions posed in paragraph 2 above:

i) The definition of ‘father’ for the purposes of CA 1989 is the common
law definition and is limited to a child’s biological/genetic father. The
definition does not, and cannot, extend to others who have acted as the
child’s psychological/social father.

ii) Where an individual is registered as a child’s ‘father’ in their birth
register entry, the parental responsibility attributed by such registration
does not attach to that individual if they are not, in fact, the
biological/genetic father of the child. In order for parental responsibility
to be acquired by registration on a birth certificate under CA 1989, s 4,
two conditions must each be fulfilled:

a) The person must be the genetic/biological father of the child; and

b) That person must be registered as ‘father’ in the child’s birth
register entry;

iii + iv) Although the parties may believe otherwise, no parental responsibility
is acquired at any stage by an individual who is wrongly registered as
‘father’ in a birth register entry. In consequence the question of whether
parental responsibility in such circumstances is automatically terminated
on the making of a declaration of non-parentage under FLA 1986, s 55A,
or requires a bespoke order, simply does not arise.

My Observations:-

Many of us have had cases where we have just followed what was said on the birth certificate and I suspect not applied our minds to the implications of when a named father is not the biological father; or whether we needed to know the answer to that question.

Should we now routinely ask the question of parents – “do you have any reason to believe that the person named as father on the birth certificate is not the biological father?”

Are we duty bound to seek the legal truth or let sleeping dogs lie? In each of the cases the implication for the children is far from satisfactory with poor “P” in the worst position of all.

In my opinion it would be wrong to proceed on the basis of the registration as father on the birth certificate as conferring parental responsibility if the issue of paternity is seriously raised by either parent.

Jo Ashwell

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Yaa Dankwa spent time as in-house lawyer with oneSource working on behalf of Havering and Newham Councils, gaining in depth knowledge in public law proceedings. She has since distinguished herself as a lawyer representing modern families.

For more information or to instruct Yaa Dankwa, please contact the clerks viaclerks@trinitychambers.com.

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Mark was a profoundly valued member of Trinity Chambers and of the Bar, which he joined following a long career as a solicitor and partner with Sternberg Reed Taylor and Gill. For those of us fortunate to be in hearings with him, it was a thrilling joy to see him rise to his feet, whether to question a professional witness, challenge a party, or make submissions. With often quiet diligence and always with determination, he made his points in court with a clarity, courtesy, and conciseness that often cut razor-like through the background noise to the heart of the matter. When Mark stood up, we all listened. And we learned.

Mark’s dedication to Trinity Chambers was complete and wholehearted. He would attend social and learning events ready to engage and share his experience and wisdom, always with great modesty and ease.

To members of Chambers, he was a kind friend and reassuring presence, whether with an open ear on a challenging legal issue or with shepherding lost members on a Chambers’ rugby tour to Rome or a long weekend of opera in Wexford.

We are sorry to announce Mark’s death in February 2026 after a long illness. For details of the funeral, please contact the clerking team: clerks@trinitychambers.com

We are left with the memories of his kindness, his compassion, and his generosity, and will be forever grateful that he was part of Chambers and legal practice in Essex.

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The Role of the Litigation Friend and the Official Solicitor
When a parent is assessed as lacking capacity and there is no one available or willing to serve as a litigation next friend, the Official Solicitor should be contacted to seek her consent to act. The Office of the Official Solicitor and Public Trustee maintains a helpful website, which includes Standard Instructions for solicitors instructed by the Official Solicitor. These instructions clarify the respective roles and expectations of the Official Solicitor. Importantly, a Litigation Friend for Civil Litigation referral form must be completed before requesting that the Official Solicitor agree to act as litigation friend.

Determining Capacity
If there is concern that a parent involved in proceedings may lack the mental capacity to conduct those proceedings, this issue should be determined as a matter of priority and as early as possible. A parent who lacks capacity is considered a “protected party.” This means they cannot conduct litigation either as a litigant in person or through a solicitor; instead, a litigation friend must be appointed to act on their behalf.

A protected party is defined as “a party, or an intended party, who lacks capacity [within the meaning of the Mental Capacity Act 2005] to conduct proceedings.” The applicable test is found in Sections 2 and 3 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, and these sections must be read alongside the overarching principles in Section 1(2), (3), and (4) of the Act.

Understanding Lack of Capacity
For the purposes of the Act, a person is considered to lack capacity in relation to a matter if, at the material time, they are unable to make a decision for themselves due to an impairment of or disturbance in the functioning of their mind or brain. The impairment or disturbance may be permanent or temporary. Lack of capacity cannot be established merely by reference to a person’s age, appearance, or a condition or aspect of behaviour that may lead to unjustified assumptions.
In any proceedings, the question of whether a person lacks capacity must be decided on the balance of probabilities.

Criteria for Inability to Make Decisions
Section 2 of the Act states that a person is unable to make a decision for themselves if they cannot:
• Understand the information relevant to the decision;
• Retain that information;
• Use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision; or
• Communicate their decision (whether by talking, sign language, or any other means).

A person is not considered able to understand relevant information if they cannot understand an explanation of it in a manner appropriate to their circumstances, such as using simple language, visual aids, or other means. The ability to retain information for only a short time does not prevent a person from being considered able to make the decision. Relevant information also includes the reasonably foreseeable consequences of making a particular decision or failing to do so.

Presumption of Capacity
The starting point in every case is the statutory principle (Section 1(2) MCA 2005) that a person must be assumed to have capacity unless it is established otherwise. It follows that a person must be presumed to have the capacity to conduct proceedings in which they are involved. Declaring that a party lacks capacity has significant legal consequences and must be based on sound legal grounds and proper evidence. Such a finding should only be made with great care, as it deprives a person of the right to bring or respond to litigation without the intervention of a litigation friend. The right to litigate is a basic right protected by English law and safeguarded by the European Convention on Human Rights; it should only be restricted in limited circumstances.

Assessment and Evidence
If the court has the benefit of an expert assessment on capacity, the situation may be clear. However, if a parent declines professional assessment, it is for the court to determine the issue based on the best evidence available. It is highly unusual for the court to make a finding on capacity without any medical or psychological evidence. While the court may have some evidence, it may not be recent. The court will generally seek more current information, considering this both proportionate and necessary, as an opinion regarding capacity in one set of proceedings does not determine the issue in another. Lack of capacity should not be assumed.

In reviewing the evidence, the court must first identify an impairment or disturbance of the mind or brain (“the diagnostic test”) and then determine whether, because of this impairment or disturbance, the protected party cannot make the decisions necessary to conduct proceedings (“the functionality test”).
The court will also consider whether the parent has recently engaged with mental health services or receives assistance from adult social services. However, some parents have minimal involvement with such services and may have declined support. The court may invite the GP or other relevant professionals or agencies to assist in determining litigation capacity.

If no expert report can be obtained and the individual refuses or does not attend a medical or psychological examination, the court must consider what other evidence is available to help make its finding and should give appropriate directions.

Participation Directions
If the parent in question chooses to be directly involved in the proceedings, participation directions should be considered. These allow for adjustments throughout the proceedings to facilitate the parent’s involvement.

Stella Young
Trinity Chambers

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Accredited journalists and legal bloggers have been able to attend, observe, hear and report on family court cases if a Transparency Order is granted. They can access some documents, quote participants, provided anonymity is preserved unless there are valid reasons for refusal. This follows a successful two-year pilot, leading to a nationwide roll-out at the end of 2024.

Journalists and legal bloggers may also request to speak to, as well as quote, people involved in the proceedings. The new open reporting provisions establish a presumption in favour of granting a Transparency Order, protecting the anonymity of children and their families, unless a legitimate reason exists to refuse it.

These provisions follow the success of the Family Court Reporting Pilot, launched in January 2023 and gradually implemented nationwide over the following two years.

The President of the Family Division Sir Andrew McFarlane [who is due to retire at Easter 2026] has described this as a “watershed moment for family Justice” emphasising the importance of improving public understanding and confidence in the Family Court. In October 2025 the President gave evidence to the house of Commons Parliamentary Justice committee regarding the reform of the Family Court. The President highlighted the significant steps taken towards greater transparency in the family courts:

‘You will know that we have opened up the court, and it is now part of business as usual that journalists can come in and report what goes on, without naming anybody. Being transparent is much more than simply letting journalists in; it is an attitude of mind. I have been prepared to go on the radio and give interviews to journalists in a way that judges probably have not before, because the public have a right to understand what we are doing on their behalf. I think being transparent will continue and continue to be something that needs to be looked at. I hope you all visit your local family courts. I hope I have encouraged all the local judges to ask their individual MPs to come in. I am sure MPs visit the local schools and local hospitals, so why not the local family court? Journalists should come into the local family court, not just to report a story—which of course they can—but to see what goes on and what makes it tick. We were called the secret family justice system or the secret family court, and I do not think that can be applied to us now. We do not want to be secret. That change has been a big one in my time.’

Aims of the key changes in the past year
The President has made clear that greater openness does not compromise privacy. The intention is to explain decisions in a manner that fosters public trust, involving not only the publication of judgments but also efforts to improve the clarity and accessibility of legal language used in those judgments. If a case falls under these provisions, parties will receive a Transparency Order outlining the reporting rules.

The Transparency Order allows for reporting of the case, but prohibits others from publishing information. It sets out what can and cannot be reported, and these rules must be strictly followed. All reported information will be anonymised to prevent identification of families, and sensitive information will remain private. Reporters require the judge’s permission, and only approved reporters may attend and report on hearings.

A reporter is either a journalist with a UK Press Card or a qualified legal blogger—typically a lawyer not involved in the case, belonging to a barristers’ chambers, law firm, or an organisation such as a university or charity, and able to verify their credentials.

Reporters may access certain basic documents such as case outlines, skeleton arguments, or position statements, to assist their understanding. Any request for additional documents must be approved by the judge.
Restrictions on Reporting

Transparency Orders specify what information may or may not be reported. Generally, reporters can describe the case details, documents, and hearing events, but cannot include:

• The names of children or family members involved
• The places where children live or attend school
• The dates of birth of any children

Additional restrictions may be imposed to prevent accidental identification, such as prohibiting the naming of social workers or foster carers. The rules are designed to ensure that even in the event of media coverage, those involved remain protected. Parties are not permitted to publish information about their own cases, including on social media, and must not share or react to media coverage. Breaching these restrictions may amount to an offence.
Judicial Discretion and Decision-Making
There should be a presumption that if a journalist or media blogger is present then Transparency Orders will be made unless there is a compelling reason not to. Parties may voice objections to reporting, but cannot opt out without the judge’s agreement. In making this decision, judges consider all circumstances, balancing specific concerns with the overarching goal of increasing transparency. The judge may:

• Grant the request and prohibit all reporting
• Modify the Transparency Order to further restrict what may be reported
• Maintain the existing Transparency Order
• Photographs of the individuals reported

It is important that parties only communicate with accredited reporters and legal bloggers, verifying credentials as necessary. Participants are not obliged to speak to reporters, and must not share restricted documents.
These reforms aim to make family courts more transparent and accountable without undermining privacy, especially in sensitive cases involving children.

Publication of Anonymised Judgments
Family court judges are now expected to publish anonymised written judgments more often. This increased publication enhances the quest for accountability, further adds to a public record of decision-making, promoting consistency, and helping both practitioners and families better understand how the law is applied in real cases. For my own part I truly welcome this as there still remains mystery and misunderstandings from the general public about how decisions are made and why, which is understandable bearing in mind the legal landscape. Where a journalist or legal blogger attends a hearing, it is good practice to record their name and contact details on the case management order. A template order can be downloaded form the Courts and tribunal Judiciary website.

Recent Case Example
I recently represented a Police Force seeking to vary the terms of a Transparency Order. Care proceedings had finalised. One of the parents was due to stand trial in relation to an allegation of murder of a child.
The court considered Part 12 of The Family Procedure Rule 2010 and Practice Direction 12R, 7.1 – 7.13 when considering whether to depart from the principle of transparency. In deciding on reporting restrictions, the court weighed the family’s rights to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the right to private and family life under Article 8 ECHR, and the rights of the press and public under Article 10 ECHR. After balancing these competing interests, the court varied the Transparency Order to allow publication of the name of the parent facing criminal trial and the deceased child therefore adjusting transparency according to the circumstances.

To date, I have encountered journalists primarily in cases allocated to the High Court rather than our local courts. This is understandable, given that the High Court handles more serious and complex matters, which tend to attract greater public interest.

Stella Young
Trinity Chambers

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Wednesday, 24^th December from 8.30am to 12pm

Re-opening on Friday, 2^nd January 2026 at 8.30am

In case of emergency, please contact our out of hours numbers – 07981 195851

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a. There shall be provision by way of a pension sharing order as follows:
i. in favour of the respondent in respect of XX % of the applicant’s rights under The XXXX Plan.
ii. the costs of implementation to be shared XX in accordance with the pension sharing annex attached to this order.
b. There be the following consequential directions:
i. it being agreed between the parties that in the event that the respondent non-member spouse predeceases the applicant member spouse after this order has taken effect but before its implementation the applicant member spouse shall have the consent of the personal representatives of the respondent non-member spouse to apply to vary or to set aside the terms of this order under FPR 2010, r 9.9A or to appeal out of time against the order under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s 40A or s 40B (as shall in the circumstances be appropriate).
ii. Neither party shall apply for the final divorce order until 28 days after the making of the pension sharing order, but the respondent will make such application promptly thereafter.
iii. Both parties shall do all that is necessary to implement the pension sharing order promptly, including, but not limited to, the signing and returning of any documents related to the implementation promptly from a written request by any person properly concerned with the implementation process and paying promptly from a proper written request for the share of the fee ordered by the court and required by the pension arrangement to effect implementation.
iv. The applicant shall not intentionally claim, draw down, transfer or otherwise deal with any pension benefits subject to a pension sharing order in this order until the pension share so ordered has been implemented, save in the event of prior written agreement as between the parties.

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