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	<title>Case Studies Archives - Trinity Chambers</title>
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		<title>Re Various Applications in respect of ‘Direct Payments’ [2026] EWCOP 42 (T2)</title>
		<link>https://www.trinitychambers.com/re-various-applications-in-respect-of-direct-payments-2026-ewcop-42-t2/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeremy Simison]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 10:03:55 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Case Studies]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.trinitychambers.com/?p=1965</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In the arena of the Court of Protection (CoP), can a property and affairs deputy manage P’s direct payments under their general authority? In Re Various Applications in respect of ‘Direct Payments’ [2026] EWCOP 42 (T2), HHJ Hilder held that they cannot. Management of direct payments goes beyond the ordinary operational management of P’s money, [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com/re-various-applications-in-respect-of-direct-payments-2026-ewcop-42-t2/">Re Various Applications in respect of ‘Direct Payments’ [2026] EWCOP 42 (T2)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com">Trinity Chambers</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In the arena of the Court of Protection (CoP), can a property and affairs deputy manage P’s direct payments under their general authority? In <a href="https://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/format.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWCOP/2026/42.html"><em>Re Various Applications in respect of ‘Direct Payments’</em> [2026] EWCOP 42 (T2)</a>, HHJ Hilder held that they cannot. Management of direct payments goes beyond the ordinary operational management of P’s money, falling outside their general authority and therefore, requires specific authority from the CoP.</p>
<p>The decision builds upon<a href="https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCOP/2021/56.html"><em> Lumb v NHS Humber and North Yorkshire ICB &amp; Anor</em> [2024] EWCOP 57 (T2)</a>, in which Senior Judge Hilder held, in the context of NHS direct payments, their management may involve welfare decision-making falling outside a property and affairs deputy’s general authority.</p>
<p>The issue in the present case was whether that reasoning applied across other statutory direct payment schemes. The applications concerned four statutory direct payment regimes; namely, the National Health Service (Direct Payments) Regulations 2013, the Care and Support (Direct Payments) Regulations 2014, the Special Educational Needs (Personal Budgets) Regulations 2014 and the Community Care, Services of Carers and Children’s Services (Direct Payments) (England) Regulations 2009.</p>
<p>The seven applications were brought by professional deputies who were already managing direct payments and who challenged Lumb’s conclusion that such management involved welfare decision-making, while seeking prospective and, where necessary, retrospective authority to continue doing so.</p>
<p>HHJ Hilder rejected the deputies’ argument. The management of direct payments is a distinct function falling outside the general authority of a property and affairs deputy. Specific authority to undertaken such management is required from the CoP, to encompass both property and affairs and welfare decision-making.</p>
<p>The critical distinction was between the mere administration of money and decisions as to how P’s care and support needs should be met. Direct payments are intended to facilitate choice; deciding that they are an appropriate means of meeting P’s needs, and how they should be deployed, therefore involves welfare decision-making. HHJ Hilder accordingly held that the reasoning in Lumb was not confined to NHS Personal Health Budgets but applied across the four schemes before the Court.</p>
<p>The judgment also addresses deputies who have historically managed direct payments without specific authority. Recognising the established practice, HHJ Hilder adopted a pragmatic approach to retrospective authorisation, including a backstop date of 11 October 2024, the date of the decision in Lumb.</p>
<p>Practically, deputies managing direct payments should review the scope of their existing authority. Future applications will require evidence addressing P’s care and support needs, the funding arrangements, alternatives to deputy management and why deputy involvement is in P’s best interests.<br />
The decision therefore confirms that managing direct payments is not merely an incident of property and affairs deputyship: where it entails decisions as to the meeting of P’s care and support needs, specific Court of Protection authority is required.</p>
<p>The key points for practitioners are therefore:<br />
1. general property and affairs authority does not, without more, authorise a deputy to manage direct payments;<br />
2. management of direct payments involves both property and affairs and welfare elements, requiring specific Court of Protection authority where undertaken within deputyship;<br />
3. the reasoning in Lumb is not confined to NHS Personal Health Budgets but applies across the direct payment schemes considered in this case; and<br />
4. existing deputies managing direct payments should review their authority and consider whether prospective and/or retrospective authorisation is required.</p>
<p>Teia Yule</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com/re-various-applications-in-respect-of-direct-payments-2026-ewcop-42-t2/">Re Various Applications in respect of ‘Direct Payments’ [2026] EWCOP 42 (T2)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com">Trinity Chambers</a>.</p>
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		<title>R v P (Appeal: Dismissal of Private Law Proceedings at Directions Hearing) Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2215 (Fam)</title>
		<link>https://www.trinitychambers.com/r-v-p-appeal-dismissal-of-private-law-proceedings-at-directions-hearing-neutral-citation-number-2026-ewhc-2215-fam/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeremy Simison]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 11 Sep 2026 09:27:40 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Case Studies]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.trinitychambers.com/?p=1959</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>This private law appeal, decided by Mr Justice Harrison, caught my eye as it had similarities to the public law case of Re H (Final Care Orders at IRH) [2025] EWCA Civ 1342 &#8211; which happened to involve Liam Sullivan, Jessica Hunter and Daniel Proctor from Trinity Chambers. By that, I note the question before [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com/r-v-p-appeal-dismissal-of-private-law-proceedings-at-directions-hearing-neutral-citation-number-2026-ewhc-2215-fam/">R v P (Appeal: Dismissal of Private Law Proceedings at Directions Hearing) Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2215 (Fam)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com">Trinity Chambers</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This private law appeal, decided by Mr Justice Harrison, caught my eye as it had similarities to the public law case of Re H (Final Care Orders at IRH) [2025] EWCA Civ 1342 &#8211; which happened to involve Liam Sullivan, Jessica Hunter and Daniel Proctor from Trinity Chambers. By that, I note the question before the court is, when is it appropriate for the court to dismiss a parties application in Children Act proceedings?</p>
<p>The question in R v P was whether the court was right to terminate the father’s application for contact with G at a one-hour directions hearing which followed a fact-finding hearing, making an order which limited him to indirect contact and imposing a restriction on the making of further applications pursuant to section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989.</p>
<p>The court confirmed that there was power to terminate the father’s application for contact as was previously re-affirmed in the Court of Appeal in Re A, B and C (Child Arrangements: Final Order At Dispute Resolution Appointment) [2025] EWCA Civ 55, where Baker LJ considered the court’s ability to make a non-consensual order at a Dispute Resolution Appointment (‘DRA’) and summarised the position at [44] as follows:</p>
<p>“Even where the parties are unable to reach an agreement, the court has the<br />
power to bring the proceedings to an end if satisfied that such a course is<br />
consistent with the welfare of the children, which under s.1 of the 1989 Act is<br />
the paramount consideration whenever the court is determining any question<br />
about the children’s upbringing”</p>
<p>In support of that conclusion, Baker LJ referred to the judgment of Sir James Munby, P<br />
in Re C (Children) (Residence Order: Application being dismissed at the Fact<br />
Finding Stage) [2012] EWCA Civ 1489, where the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal<br />
against a judge’s decision reached after an abbreviated hearing of the evidence. The<br />
former President observed:</p>
<p>“14. … It has long been recognised – and authority need not be quoted for this<br />
proposition – that for this reason a judge exercising the family jurisdiction has<br />
a much broader discretion than he would in the civil jurisdiction to determine<br />
the way in which an application of the kind being made by the father should be<br />
pursued. In an appropriate case he can summarily dismiss the application as<br />
being, if not groundless, lacking enough merit to justify pursuing the matter. He<br />
may determine that the matter is one to be dealt with on the basis of written<br />
evidence and oral submissions without the need for oral evidence. He may, as<br />
Judge Cliffe did in the present case, decide to hear the evidence of the applicant<br />
and then take stock of where the matter stands at the end of the evidence.</p>
<p>15. The judge in such a situation will always be concerned to ask himself: is<br />
there some solid reason in the interests of the children why I should embark<br />
upon, or, having embarked upon, why I should continue exploring the matters<br />
which one or other of the parents seeks to raise. If there is or may be solid<br />
advantage in the children in doing so, then the inquiry will proceed, albeit it<br />
may be on the basis of submissions rather than oral evidence. But if the judge is<br />
satisfied that no advantage to the children is going to be obtained by continuing<br />
the investigation further, then it is perfectly within his case management powers<br />
and the proper exercises of his discretion so to decide and to determine that the<br />
proceedings should go no further.<br />
…<br />
18. It is pre-eminently a matter for the trial judge in a case of this sort to<br />
determine the form of procedure which will best meet the welfare needs of the<br />
children. A judge is not obliged, merely because one parent or the other wishes<br />
him to do so, to listen to evidence if it has become apparent to him that the<br />
process is not going to be of any advantage to the children. That was the view<br />
Judge Cliffe took. It was a robust view, but it is quite impossible, in my<br />
judgment, to assert that the judge, in taking that view and adopting that<br />
approach, exceeded the generous ambit of discretion which the law conferred<br />
upon him as the trial judge.”</p>
<p>Back to the case in hand, Mr Justice Harrison went through the background to the case, which will not be set out here. One interesting point: the judge at first instance directed the mother and the father to file statements of evidence limited to 5 pages, setting out their response to the court&#8217;s findings of fact. This is what Mr Justice Harrison had to say about this course of action “ In accordance with the judge’s directions, each of the parties filed short statements responding to the fact-finding judgment. Although I have not heard argument on this specific issue, I have some reservations about the utility of this course. If, in the aftermath of a judgment, a party files a statement accepting all of a judge’s findings against them, this must surely give rise to questions about whether that acceptance is sincere or whether it has merely been proffered to appease the court. For the father to come to a genuine acceptance of findings made about his conduct is likely to require more than the filing of a statement and to entail some form of specialist work.”</p>
<p>Of note, both the court at first instance and the appeal court found the father’s statement to say one thing but mean another. Ie, the court took the view that the father was not really accepting the findings, despite having asserted that he did. The father’s appeal was effectively that the court’s decision on the contact application was procedurally irregular and wrong.</p>
<p>Ultimately, despite sympathy for the mother&#8217;s submissions, the court allowed the appeal. The reasons for allowing the appeal were multifaceted, but if I may draw from one of the conclusions from the judgment. At paragraph 69 of the judgment, the court said as follows “I am unable to accept Ms Whelan’s submission to the effect that the court should not waste its resources for the benefit of a father who has refused to accept its findings. It must not be forgotten that whatever faults he may have as a father, it is the child who has a right to have a relationship with him, provided it can safely be achieved. She, and not the father, is the court’s focus. The court should not lightly cast aside the long-term significance for her welfare of growing up without any meaningful relationship with her father or potentially even knowledge of him”</p>
<p>In short, although the court has the power to conclude matters at a DRA hearing, on this occasion, for the reasons set out in the Judgment of the court, this approach was approved of on the facts of the case.</p>
<p>William Green<br />
Trinity Chambers</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com/r-v-p-appeal-dismissal-of-private-law-proceedings-at-directions-hearing-neutral-citation-number-2026-ewhc-2215-fam/">R v P (Appeal: Dismissal of Private Law Proceedings at Directions Hearing) Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2215 (Fam)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com">Trinity Chambers</a>.</p>
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		<title>KM v LN (Appeal: Occupation Order and Interim Child Arrangements) [2026] EWHC 2123 (Fam) (7 August 2026)</title>
		<link>https://www.trinitychambers.com/km-v-ln-appeal-occupation-order-and-interim-child-arrangements-2026-ewhc-2123-fam-7-august-2026/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeremy Simison]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 04 Sep 2026 17:30:50 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Case Studies]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.trinitychambers.com/?p=1954</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>When considering an occupation order excluding a parent from the property, what is the interplay between such an order and any consequential changes to child arrangements? In KM v LN, Poole J clarified that whilst the health, safety and well-being of any child is relevant, the children’s welfare is not the paramount consideration and s1(3) [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com/km-v-ln-appeal-occupation-order-and-interim-child-arrangements-2026-ewhc-2123-fam-7-august-2026/">KM v LN (Appeal: Occupation Order and Interim Child Arrangements) [2026] EWHC 2123 (Fam) (7 August 2026)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com">Trinity Chambers</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When considering an occupation order excluding a parent from the property, what is the interplay between such an order and any consequential changes to child arrangements? In <em>KM v LN</em>, Poole J clarified that whilst the health, safety and well-being of any child is relevant, the children’s welfare is not the paramount consideration and s1(3) Children Act 1989 is not the governing statutory test.</p>
<p>Applications for occupation orders excluding one party from the property often arise alongside disputes concerning the children. Whilst any decision regarding interim child arrangements within such proceedings must apply the paramountcy principle and conduct a welfare analysis, Poole J outlined the distinction in Family Law Act (FLA) proceedings, where the Court’s consideration is focused on any child’s health, safety and well-being when granting an occupation order which consequently requires a change in child arrangements. The CA statutory framework is not applicable in FLA proceedings; the Court is to consider any child’s welfare through s33, specifically their health, safety and well-being.</p>
<p>The potential impact of an occupation order on interim child arrangments is not unusual. The issue before Poole J was whether the trial judge had erred in law through his failure to apply the paramountcy principle and his failure to conduct an analysis of the welfare checklist in the FLA proceedings when as a consequence of granting an occupation order, the child arrangements order had to be altered in the interim. Poole J rejected this proposition.</p>
<p>The judgment succinctly outlines the applicable considerations when the Court is faced with tackling the interplay between occupation orders and interim child arrangements, in that:</p>
<p>1. ‘If it appeared to the court that the applicant or any relevant child would be likely to suffer significant harm attributable to the conduct of the respondent if an order under s33(7) were not made, the balance of significant harm under s33(7)(a) and (b); or,</p>
<p>2. If it as found that s33(7) was not applicable, how the revised child arrangements would affect the health, safety or well-being of the parties and of any relevant child and any other relevant circumstances under ss33(6) including s33(6)(c).’ at [31].</p>
<p>The proceedings concerned an occupation order application under the FLA, which arose in the context of the parties’ separation, with concurrent financial remedy proceedings and CA proceedings concerning A and B. At the time of determination of the FLA application, the financial remedy proceedings were listed for final determination some three weeks later, and final determination of the CA proceedings was listed for just over two months later. Both parties and the children were residing in the home under a partial nesting arrangement which had been in place since September 2025, underpinned by an interim child arrangements order. For the most part, both parents resided in the home, but for defined periods, one would leave and reside in a hotel funded by F, so that the other could spend time alone with the children.</p>
<p>M’s application was for an occupation order excluding F from the home entirely. The trial judge was assisted by evidence from M, F and the allocated social worker. Her evidence was plain that the parents continuing to cohabit was harmful to both children and the parental conflict, ongoing proceedings and Local Authority involvement were particularly having a significant impact on A’s emotional wellbeing. The allocated social worker concluded that ‘a change in circumstance within the family environment is vital’ and the children being caught in the middle of parental conflict was the most harmful factor in the children’s lives.</p>
<p>The family had significant means, with there being no concerns about financing alternative accommodation.</p>
<p>Against this backdrop, Poole J was required to determine whether the trial judge had properly considered the children and the impact on the interim child arrangements, and whether that consideration had been in accordance with the requisite test.</p>
<p>Poole J’s judgment is clear that the Court is not bound to consider the paramountcy principle or conduct a welfare analysis in accordance with s1(3) of the CA in the confines of FLA proceedings when any such order would have a direct effect on existing child arrangements. The appropriate consideration in this context is centred around either the balance of significant harm under s33(7)(a) and (b) or any effect of the revised arrangements on the health, safety and well-being of the parties or any relevant child. This approach provides a distinct focus within FLA proceedings.</p>
<p>Poole J took the view that the trial judge had correctly considered all of the circumstances, including the impact on the well-being of the children. He heard the strong evidence of the allocated social worker, that the harm these children were suffering as a direct result of their current living arrangements, along with her recommendation that the family environment needed to change. He had considered whether the occupation order, and therefore the consequential change of child arrangements, was in the best interests of the children. The trial judge had found that it was ‘patently obvious’ that the current arrangements were disruptive for A and B, and the conflictual environment needed to end. He also noted that a continuation of the nesting arrangement, in any form, would risk causing emotional harm to M.</p>
<p><em>KM v LN</em> is helpful in directing the Court’s considerations towards any impact on child arrangements orders within FLA proceedings. The well-being of any child involved must be considered within the context of the FLA framework, rather than by treating welfare as the paramount consideration under the Children Act 1989.</p>
<p>The full judgment can be accessed here: <a href="https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewhc/fam/2026/2123?from_date=2026-01-01&amp;to_date=2026-08-13&amp;court=ewca%2Fciv&amp;court=ewhc%2Ffam&amp;court=ewfc">https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewhc/fam/2026/2123?from_date=2026-01-01&amp;to_date=2026-08-13&amp;court=ewca%2Fciv&amp;court=ewhc%2Ffam&amp;court=ewfc </a></p>
<p>Teia Yule</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com/km-v-ln-appeal-occupation-order-and-interim-child-arrangements-2026-ewhc-2123-fam-7-august-2026/">KM v LN (Appeal: Occupation Order and Interim Child Arrangements) [2026] EWHC 2123 (Fam) (7 August 2026)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com">Trinity Chambers</a>.</p>
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		<title>Potanina v Potanin (No.3) (Video Evidence from Abroad) [2026] EWHC 1738 (Fam) (14 July 2026)</title>
		<link>https://www.trinitychambers.com/potanina-v-potanin-no-3-video-evidence-from-abroad-2026-ewhc-1738-fam-14-july-2026/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeremy Simison]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 07 Aug 2026 08:39:04 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Case Studies]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.trinitychambers.com/?p=1943</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Can a witness give evidence remotely from abroad without invoking the Hague Evidence Convention? In Potanina v Potanin (No.3) MacDonald J confirmed that, in family proceedings, the answer will ordinarily be yes where the witness volunteers to give evidence. MacDonald J has provided welcome clarification that, in family proceedings, the ordinary procedure remains that a [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com/potanina-v-potanin-no-3-video-evidence-from-abroad-2026-ewhc-1738-fam-14-july-2026/">Potanina v Potanin (No.3) (Video Evidence from Abroad) [2026] EWHC 1738 (Fam) (14 July 2026)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com">Trinity Chambers</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Can a witness give evidence remotely from abroad without invoking the Hague Evidence Convention? In Potanina v Potanin (No.3) MacDonald J confirmed that, in family proceedings, the answer will ordinarily be yes where the witness volunteers to give evidence.</p>
<p>MacDonald J has provided welcome clarification that, in family proceedings, the ordinary procedure remains that a witness who volunteers to give evidence from abroad may do so directly by video-link without invoking the Hague Convention 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Proceedings.</p>
<p>The practice of giving evidence by video-link from abroad has been long-established in family proceedings. The issue before MacDonald J was whether this practice required compliance with the Hague Convention procedure whenever a witness volunteered to give evidence from another jurisdiction. MacDonald J rejected that proposition.</p>
<p>The judgment establishes four propositions of practical propositions:</p>
<p>1. voluntary evidence may ordinarily be received by video-link;<br />
2. the Hague Convention is not mandatory;<br />
3. the consent from the foreign state is not ordinarily required; and<br />
4. different considerations arise where the witness must be compelled.</p>
<p>The proceedings concerned a financial remedy application under the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984. They arose in the context of the husband’s designation under the United Kingdom’s sanctions regime. Consequently, he was prohibited from entering or remaining in the United Kingdom and was subject to an asset freeze. He contended that these restrictions prevented his attendance at trial and deprived him of the means to arrange appropriate private security should he be required to travel to this jurisdiction. Although he was simultaneously engaged in commercial proceedings and previously engaged in First-tier Tribunal proceedings, no provision had been made for him to give evidence remotely from Russia.<br />
Prior to the hearing, enquiries were directed to the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office’s Taking of Evidence Team pursuant to FPR PD22A. The response incorrectly advised that the Russian Federation was not a Contracting State to the Hague Convention and that the husband would therefore be required to proceed by way of a Letter of Request. An application was made on that basis.</p>
<p>Against that background, MacDonald J was required to determine the appropriate procedural mechanism by which the husband should give evidence. The judgment addresses a question of considerable practical importance: whether, in family proceedings, a witness who voluntarily agrees to give evidence by video-link from abroad must first comply with the procedures prescribed by the Hague Convention.</p>
<p>The Court answered that question firmly in the negative. MacDonald J distinguished the immigration authorities of Nare (Evidence by Electronic Means) Zimbabwe [2011] UKUT 00443 (IAC) and Agbabiaka (Evidence from Abroad; Nare Guidance) Nigeria [2021] UKUT 286 (IAC) previously considered appropriate in SA v AA [2023] EWHC 2016 (Fam). It was held that those decisions arose within a different statutory and procedural context and did not reflect the long-established practice of the Family Division. They, therefore, are not applicable to remote evidence in family proceedings.</p>
<p>This decision will be welcomed by family practitioners since it removes the uncertainty previously in existence of the approach and confirms the long-established practice in family proceedings. The impact of this approach is that is avoids unnecessary delay and expense where evidence can properly be taken via video-link.<br />
Departing from newly established ordinary position, MacDonald J indicated that the Hague Convention should be utilised when a witness does not volunteer to give evidence via video-link from abroad and need to be compelled. Similarly, it was suggested that the Hague Convention should be utilised when, despite the witness volunteering to give evidence, there is a need for formal identification of such witness or when taking action for contempt or perjury.</p>
<p>Potanina is now likely to become the leading authority on the ordinary approach to voluntary video evidence from abroad in family proceedings. It provides certainty in the approach whilst preserving sufficient flexibility where compulsion or comity concerns arise.</p>
<p>The decision is another illustration of the Family Division&#8217;s pragmatic approach to remote participation following the widespread adoption of video hearings since the pandemic.</p>
<p>Although the judgment simplifies domestic procedure, it leaves unresolved the practical consequences should a foreign state regard the taking of evidence as contrary to its domestic law.</p>
<p>The full judgment can be accessed here: https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewhc/fam/2026/1738</p>
<p>Teia Yule</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com/potanina-v-potanin-no-3-video-evidence-from-abroad-2026-ewhc-1738-fam-14-july-2026/">Potanina v Potanin (No.3) (Video Evidence from Abroad) [2026] EWHC 1738 (Fam) (14 July 2026)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com">Trinity Chambers</a>.</p>
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		<title>F (Children: Placement Orders: Proportionality) [2026] EWCA Civ 990</title>
		<link>https://www.trinitychambers.com/f-children-placement-orders-proportionality-2026-ewca-civ-990/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeremy Simison]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 31 Jul 2026 16:37:01 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Case Studies]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.trinitychambers.com/?p=1940</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>1. Here we go, Lord Justice Peter Jackson is back tackling the best subject in the world, proportionality. 2. The final hearing of the case in the County Court was segmented for a number of reasons, resulting in two separate judgments. On appeal, those judgments were treated as a single judgment. 3. The parents were [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com/f-children-placement-orders-proportionality-2026-ewca-civ-990/">F (Children: Placement Orders: Proportionality) [2026] EWCA Civ 990</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com">Trinity Chambers</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>1. Here we go, Lord Justice Peter Jackson is back tackling the best subject in the world, proportionality.</p>
<p>2. The final hearing of the case in the County Court was segmented for a number of reasons, resulting in two separate judgments. On appeal, those judgments were treated as a single judgment.</p>
<p>3. The parents were from Pakistan. The parents&#8217; immigration status was described as precarious. The concerns of the local authority concerned domestic abuse, injuries to one of the children and parental dishonesty.</p>
<p>4. For various reasons, the first final hearing was treated as a threshold hearing only. The court made findings, and these were not subject to appeal.</p>
<p>5. A welfare hearing took place between 16-20 March 2026. The Local Authority, supported by the Children’s Guardian, sought a care and placement order. The hearing did not achieve its intended purpose. By the end, the judge was not satisfied that the analysis undertaken by the local authority and the Guardian conformed with the requirements of Re B-S. However, the Judge did give a substantial judgment dealing with the issue of risk.</p>
<p>6. The third hearing took place in May 2026, the judge having heard further evidence and submissions. The Judgment that followed approved the local authority plan for adoption.</p>
<p>7. The mother appealed on two grounds, firstly, that the making of a Care and Placement order was not necessary and proportionate and secondly, that the Judge’s welfare evaluation was procedurally flawed and amounted to a linear rather than a holistic assessment of the realistic options.</p>
<p>8. LJ Peter Jackson dismissed the second ground of appeal. However, and in saying “I have not found this an entirely easy appeal”, LJ Peter Jackson did allow the appeal on the second ground.</p>
<p>9. The Judge referred to Re H-W (Children) [2022] UKSC 17 as well as the absolute classic text from Hedley J in Re L (Care: Threshold Criteria) [2007] 1 FLR 2050.</p>
<p>10. LJ Peter Jackson went on to say: Taking all these matters into account, my conclusion is that, despite unanimous professional advice and the care that she evidently took, the judge’s welfare assessment fell short in two linked ways. The first is that there was an insufficient focus on the realistically likely consequences for these children of such harm as they were likely to suffer in maternal or parental care. The second was that there was an insufficient recognition of the potential ability of the state to support these children within their family by means of a combination of:</p>
<p>(i) supervisory or coercive measures under s.31 of the Children Act 1989<br />
(ii) a Domestic Abuse Protection Order (DAPO) under the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, which can exist without limit of time and breach of which is a criminal offence;<br />
(iii) any voluntary interventions by local authority support services and by other agencies working with the parents, who might (if properly briefed) add another layer of vigilance.</p>
<p>11. To that end, my favourite line in the judgement is as follows: “It is a disappointing, even bleak, conclusion that the child protection system could contribute nothing towards increasing the safety of the children of this unreliable but otherwise able victim of domestic abuse.”</p>
<p>12. About proportionality, the Judge also noted that “The judge was also right to look at the totality of the risks, but again the court must always maintain a sense of proportion and base its risk assessment on conclusions that can fairly spring from the evidence.” Further, “The judge vividly acknowledged most aspects of this certain and significant harm, for example in the May judgment at [70], but despite repeated readings of the judgments I cannot identify why she considered that it was so outweighed by the future risks as to make permanent separation and adoption necessary. If she considered that any undetected resumption of domestic abuse would be unacceptable, that would be disproportionate. As Hedley J said, some children will experience disadvantage and harm and, as I put it in Re T, risk assessment is not about the elimination of all risks.”</p>
<p>13. This case nicely sets out the importance of the court analysing risk, the likelihood of the risk and its consequences for the children. Importantly, how can that risk be reduced or managed?</p>
<p>14. The court must then consider other welfare factors and determine which realistic plan best meets the child&#8217;s needs. Of course, if the plan interferes with the child’s Article 8 rights, are the orders sought necessary and proportionate?</p>
<p>Will Green</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com/f-children-placement-orders-proportionality-2026-ewca-civ-990/">F (Children: Placement Orders: Proportionality) [2026] EWCA Civ 990</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com">Trinity Chambers</a>.</p>
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		<title>Parental Responsibility – is being registered on the Birth Certificate as the father enough?</title>
		<link>https://www.trinitychambers.com/parental-responsibility-is-being-registered-on-the-birth-certificate-as-the-father-enough/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeremy Simison]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 07 Jun 2026 19:25:16 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Articles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Case Studies]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.trinitychambers.com/?p=1898</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Re M, Re, J and Re P Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWCA Civ 344 The court heard three separate appeals, each relating to the attribution of parental responsibility and the status of ‘father’ with respect to a child. For me the most interesting and knotty was the third appeal in respect of Re P so [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com/parental-responsibility-is-being-registered-on-the-birth-certificate-as-the-father-enough/">Parental Responsibility – is being registered on the Birth Certificate as the father enough?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com">Trinity Chambers</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Re M, Re, J and Re P Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWCA Civ 344</p>
<p>The court heard three separate appeals, each relating to the attribution of parental responsibility and the status of ‘father’ with respect to a child. For me the most interesting and knotty was the third appeal in respect of Re P so I have reversed the order and dealt with that case first.</p>
<p>The questions posed for the SC (paragraph 2)</p>
<p>The Re M and Re J cases raised the following basic questions:</p>
<p>i) Is the definition of ‘father’ for the purposes of Children Act 1989 [‘CA<br />
1989’] limited to a child’s biological/genetic father, or may it extend to<br />
others who have acted as the child’s psychological/social father?</p>
<p>The short answer is no.</p>
<p>ii) Where an individual is registered as a child’s ‘father’ in their birth<br />
register entry, does parental responsibility attributed by such registration<br />
attach to a ‘father’ who is not, in fact, the biological/genetic father of<br />
that child?</p>
<p>Again, the short answer is no.</p>
<p>iii) If, in response to (ii), parental responsibility is afforded to a non-<br />
biological father, is it automatically terminated upon the making of a<br />
declaration that the individual is not the child’s father under Family Law<br />
Act 1986, s 55A [‘FLA 1986’], or does the attribution of parental<br />
responsibility continue unless and until it is terminated by a separate CA<br />
1989 court order?</p>
<p>And another short answer – it was never acquired notwithstanding the entry on the birth of certificate.</p>
<p>iv) If, in response to (iii), a separate court order is required to terminate<br />
parental responsibility in such circumstances, is this a decision to be<br />
determined by affording paramount consideration to the child’s welfare,<br />
or on some other basis?</p>
<p>And in light of (iii) the answer is no.</p>
<p>“The third case, which, in common with the first two, raised the question of<br />
parental responsibility attributed following the naming of an individual as<br />
‘father’ in a birth register entry, had an additional level of complexity arising<br />
from the fact that the mother had engaged in sexual intercourse with each of two<br />
identical male twins in the course of one week at the time that conception must<br />
have occurred. As a result, whilst DNA testing establishes that the child’s<br />
biological father is one of these twins, it is not possible to say which of them it<br />
is.”</p>
<p>In this case the decision was to make an order termination parental responsibility as it could not be said he was not the father; which would be a pre-requisite for removal from the register.</p>
<p>Re P: the factual context</p>
<p>In the third case, P was the elder of two children before the court in private law proceedings at the time of the child’s birth the mother had been in a relationship with TP1 (who was a twin of TP2); and TP1 was registered on the birth certificate as her father.. When the relationship between M and TP1 broke down the question arose as to which of the brothers was the biological father the court having found that as they had each engaged in sexual intercourse with the mother within a four day period in the. month that P was conceived. The DNA showed that each of them could be the father, court unsurprisingly found that there was a 50/50 chance of each of the brothers being her father. The court at first instance left the issue of parental responsibility to the higher court aware of pending appeals on the issue.</p>
<p>On appeal to the CA the mother was aligned with TP2, the court at first instance had made orders that shared the care of P between the 3 adults; but had decided that could not conclude that the registration of TP1 as the father was wrong.</p>
<p>The CA found that “whilst the position that has been reached means that TP1 will remain as ‘father ‘in the birth register entry, the question of the continuation of parental responsibility is a separate issue. The court retains the power to terminate any parental responsibility that has been acquired, or in this case may have been acquired, by s 4(1), by making an order discharging parental responsibility under s 4(2A).”</p>
<p>At paragraph 96 the court said “the situation resulting from the judge’s order and this court’s determination on the principal issue is that if TP1 is the legal father he has parental responsibility, but if he is not he does not, yet it cannot be said whether he is or is not the legal. father. That outcome is not in P’s best interests and is contrary to her overall welfare. It is understandable that the judge left the disentanglement of the legal issue to this court (when it was known that the other appeals were to be heard). With the benefit of the hindsight now achieved as to the definition of father, in my view it was wrong for the court not to achieve clarity by discharging any parental responsibility that TP1 may have had by making an order under CA 1989, s 4(2A). The basis for discharging parental responsibility is, firstly, that, as he is not proved to be the father, TP1 should not have been registered as ‘father’ and he is not a candidate for the acquisition of parental responsibility under s 4(1). Secondly, it is plainly not in P’s welfare interests for this ambiguity as to parental responsibility to continue an order will be made under CA 1989, s 4(2A) that any. parental responsibility that TP1 may have acquired under s 4(1) by registration as ‘father’ in P’s birth register entry shall cease from the date of this court’s order and any further order that may be made following additional submissions in that case relating to ‘welfare’.</p>
<p>In the other two of cases, the status of an individual who had been registered as ‘father’ in a child’s birth register entry was subsequently challenged. In one case the genuine assumption that the individual was the biological father of the child was found to be wrong, in the other it had always been known that he was not the biological father, but in both cases the individuals had acted as a psychological or social father to the child and both did so believing that they shared parental responsibility with the child’s mother as a result of being registered as ‘father’ on the birth register entry.”</p>
<p>Re J</p>
<p>In the first case where the named father believed he was the natural father the court found that (paragraph 34) (b) as AJ was not J’s father, he was not eligible to be registered as ‘father’ in J’s birth register entry;</p>
<p>c) No legal or practical difficulty had been identified in holding that a false, but genuine, understanding that an individual had held parental responsibility was void ab initio. In particular, any parental acts undertaken by such an individual would legitimately come within the authorisation provided by CA 1989, s 3(5);</p>
<p>d) AJ did not, therefore, acquire parental responsibility upon being named as J’s father in the birth register entry and, consequently, he has never held parental responsibility for J;</p>
<p>e) Accordingly, no order was required to remove parental<br />
responsibility from him.</p>
<p>Re M</p>
<p>In the second case the father new he was not the father as the parents had bought sperm on the internet as a consequence; he was not afforded the same status as he would have been if using a licenced clinic. Though the legal process was slightly different in that the mother had applied for a declaration of non-paternity; the court held that as a result of the declaration of non-paternity, any parental responsibility that AM had held for M would be lost. In the alternative, on the facts and applying the welfare principle, if an order under s 4(2A) removing parental responsibility was required, she would have made such an order.</p>
<p>The conclusion of the court (paragraph 80) was “referring to the list of questions posed in paragraph 2 above:</p>
<p>i) The definition of ‘father’ for the purposes of CA 1989 is the common<br />
law definition and is limited to a child’s biological/genetic father. The<br />
definition does not, and cannot, extend to others who have acted as the<br />
child’s psychological/social father.</p>
<p>ii) Where an individual is registered as a child’s ‘father’ in their birth<br />
register entry, the parental responsibility attributed by such registration<br />
does not attach to that individual if they are not, in fact, the<br />
biological/genetic father of the child. In order for parental responsibility<br />
to be acquired by registration on a birth certificate under CA 1989, s 4,<br />
two conditions must each be fulfilled:</p>
<p>a) The person must be the genetic/biological father of the child; and</p>
<p>b) That person must be registered as ‘father’ in the child’s birth<br />
register entry;</p>
<p>iii + iv) Although the parties may believe otherwise, no parental responsibility<br />
is acquired at any stage by an individual who is wrongly registered as<br />
‘father’ in a birth register entry. In consequence the question of whether<br />
parental responsibility in such circumstances is automatically terminated<br />
on the making of a declaration of non-parentage under FLA 1986, s 55A,<br />
or requires a bespoke order, simply does not arise.</p>
<p>My Observations:-</p>
<p>Many of us have had cases where we have just followed what was said on the birth certificate and I suspect not applied our minds to the implications of when a named father is not the biological father; or whether we needed to know the answer to that question.</p>
<p>Should we now routinely ask the question of parents &#8211; “do you have any reason to believe that the person named as father on the birth certificate is not the biological father?”</p>
<p>Are we duty bound to seek the legal truth or let sleeping dogs lie? In each of the cases the implication for the children is far from satisfactory with poor “P” in the worst position of all.</p>
<p>In my opinion it would be wrong to proceed on the basis of the registration as father on the birth certificate as conferring parental responsibility if the issue of paternity is seriously raised by either parent.</p>
<p>Jo Ashwell</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com/parental-responsibility-is-being-registered-on-the-birth-certificate-as-the-father-enough/">Parental Responsibility – is being registered on the Birth Certificate as the father enough?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com">Trinity Chambers</a>.</p>
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		<title>Re N (A Child Placement Order: Proportionality) [2025] EWCA Civ 1541</title>
		<link>https://www.trinitychambers.com/re-n-a-child-placement-order-proportionality-2025-ewca-civ-1541/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeremy Simison]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 03 Dec 2025 20:25:45 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Case Studies]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.trinitychambers.com/?p=1813</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>1. The concept of proportionality often lingers in my mind when preparing for a final hearing. It&#8217;s like the persistent dripping tap that, despite multiple checks, resumes dripping the moment you sit down. This nagging thought compels me to re-examine my papers, seeking the connection that leads professionals to conclude that due to deficiencies in [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com/re-n-a-child-placement-order-proportionality-2025-ewca-civ-1541/">Re N (A Child Placement Order: Proportionality) [2025] EWCA Civ 1541</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com">Trinity Chambers</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>1. The concept of proportionality often lingers in my mind when preparing for a final hearing. It&#8217;s like the persistent dripping tap that, despite multiple checks, resumes dripping the moment you sit down. This nagging thought compels me to re-examine my papers, seeking the connection that leads professionals to conclude that due to deficiencies in parenting, a permanent separation is necessary. Where is the nexus between point A and Point B? Sometimes, the risks don&#8217;t seem to justify the outcome.</p>
<p>2. In recent times, numerous Court of Appeal decisions have addressed the concept of proportionality. Often, this principle is subtly embedded within different terminologies. However, the recent case of Re N directly confronts the common understanding of proportionality</p>
<p>3. Lord Justice Peter Jackson delivered the Judgment, he being no stranger to proportionality. The facts of Re N were perhaps a little different to so many of the care cases that we deal with. To keep the reader engaged the following bullet points sets out the factual matrix.</p>
<p>4. So here are the facts:-</p>
<ul>
<li>L, the subject child, was a boy of 2 years of age.</li>
<li>The mother was a 57 year old Japanese national. She was a professional person, who lived and worked in this country for a number of years.</li>
<li>In 2015 her husband died.</li>
<li>The mother had no support from family in this country. She decided to have a child, and L was born in October 2023 after assisted conception overseas.</li>
<li>The local authority became involved upon L’s birth. Nursing staff at the hospital felt that the mother was unable to care for him independently, and required prompting in areas of personal care and feeding</li>
<li>When L was 3 weeks old, he and his mother went to what was the first of three separate placements which lasted for the next 21 months. The mother agreed to these placements under section 20 Children Act 1989 and no statutory order was made in respect of L until the final order conferred parental responsibility on the local authority.</li>
<li>The final hearing took place between 11th and 15th August 2025 before Recorder Magennis.</li>
<li>At final hearing the mother contested that the threshold criteria had been crossed for the making of public law orders but note that this was not a matter subject to the appeal.</li>
<li>The court at first instance found that threshold was crossed on the likelihood of harm.</li>
<li>The court then went on to make a Care Order and a Placement Order. The court of appeal quotes heavily from the judgment at first instance, and it is, time permitting, worthy of a read.</li>
<li>The mother appealed (note new solicitors). None of the trial counsel appeared in the Appeal hearing.</li>
</ul>
<p>5. The court having set out the facts (in a lot of detail all of which was required) Lord Justice Peter Jackson then considered the principles. As he said, “unusual cases prompt a return to first principles”.</p>
<p>Bullet points of those principles follow:-</p>
<ul>
<li>In Re B (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Threshold Criteria) [2013] UKSC 33; [2013] 1 WLR 1911, the Supreme Court confirmed that a care order can only be made if it is necessary in a democratic society for the protection of a child’s right to grow up free from harm, and proportionate to the needs of the situation.</li>
<li>Y v United Kingdom (2012) 55 EHRR “ [F]amily ties may only be severed in very exceptional circumstances and that everything must be done to preserve personal relations and, where appropriate, to “rebuild” the family. It is not enough to show that a child could be placed in a more beneficial environment for his upbringing.”</li>
<li>LJ Peter Jackson referred to the case of Re F (almost a classic now) whereby he said “I suggested that in assessing the risk of future harm, the court should consider: the type of harm that may arise; the likelihood of it arising; the severity of the consequences if it arose; and what risk reduction or mitigation steps can be taken.</li>
<li>Back to the analysis of the court, LJ Peter Jackson said as follows “In Re B, in a finding upheld by the Supreme Court, the trial judge had expressed himself satisfied that the threshold had been crossed, “not perhaps in the most extreme way that is seen in some cases but crossed it has been”. That, in my view, is the situation here. The mother’s characteristics, unusual for a parent facing care proceedings in this country, led a number of professionals to express real concern about her parenting and her often dismissive response to guidance. These observations, coming from a range of experienced observers, had to be taken seriously, but they were not the end of the matter. The critical next question was whether the risks to L in early childhood, assessed in the light of whatever support might be effective, were so great as to justify the permanent dissolution of this small family.” As already mentioned, the findings of threshold were never appealed but it is helpful to read what the court of appeal’s view was on the issue. In short, not the most serve but the Rubicon was crossed.</li>
</ul>
<p>7. The following passage from Lord Justice Peter Jackson is worth remembering. “The case for adoption was illustrated by a large number of small incidents and the generally dismissive parental reaction. No doubt the professionals were right and the mother was wrong about many of those matters, but the court needed to maintain a sense of proportion and keep the bigger picture in view. Adoption on the basis of evidence of this nature was an improbable outcome and it required particularly compelling justification. Reasoning of that kind is not to be found in the evidence or in the judgment and the orders in this case cannot therefore be upheld.”.</p>
<p>8. So, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. But why and what were the conclusions we can take from this case. Again, hats off to the court for giving me some fuel for future submissions. This is what LJ Peter Jackson said :-</p>
<ul>
<li>“In the first place, this was a case of the kind referred to in Re B where “the feared harm has not yet materialised and may never do so”. Despite the presence of another adult, the mother had been L’s primary carer for nearly two years, during which no harm, still less significant harm, had come to him. That factor had to be taken into account when the court was considering future risks. However, the recorder made no reference to it in the passage cited” AND “In L’s case, even if he came by additional accidents due to his mother’s inattention to risk, there is no reason to believe that the consequences of individual events would be worse for him than for any other child. In accepting the ISW’s assessment of risk, the recorder unduly elevated the significance of this element of the welfare checklist.”</li>
<li> “The second difficulty concerns the recorder’s approach to possible measures of support. It is true that the mother had reacted poorly to direct parenting advice. At the same time, her case was that she wanted to work, and that she would employ a nanny or childminder. L is already at an age when he could be at a nursery and in due course he will go to school. The recorder did not explore the obvious possible benefits of these foreseeable arrangements, but instead simply accepted the view of Ms Harold that effective support (i.e. 24/7) could not be offered: see [89] at paragraph 19 above. However, there was no reason to think that round-the-clock support was needed or would be needed indefinitely, or that the mother, who had voluntarily accepted extensive limitations on her freedom of action for nearly two years, would not abide by reasonable conditions in future, whatever she might personally think of them.”</li>
<li> “The mother’s lack of insight into professional concerns was relevant, but its significance very much depended on the nature and validity of the concerns themselves, and on the extent to which effective protection might depend on insight, as opposed to other measures.”</li>
</ul>
<p>9. I think Re N is a helpful reminder to all practitioners that a linear approach to cases is not helpful. Too often we are faced with evidence of risk of harm that just gets over the threshold criteria. In cases involving young children, with no support networks, how often are parents faced with care plans for adoption? Often there is a gaping hole in the analysis, where the Re F factors are forgotten or marginally considered but given the cold shoulder. Or else, we get the inevitable oral evidence from the social worker that “ the parents will need to have 24 hour supervision” As quoted above “the court needed to maintain a sense of proportion and keep the bigger picture in view.” Although the facts of Re N are unusual, I am pleased that the Court of Appeal had an opportunity to deal with a case like this whereby the feared harm had not happened and might not materialise.</p>
<p><strong>William Green </strong><br />
<strong>Trinity Chambers.</strong></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com/re-n-a-child-placement-order-proportionality-2025-ewca-civ-1541/">Re N (A Child Placement Order: Proportionality) [2025] EWCA Civ 1541</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com">Trinity Chambers</a>.</p>
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		<title>Clarifying Matrimonial and Non Matrimonial Property, the Standish Case</title>
		<link>https://www.trinitychambers.com/clarifying-matrimonial-and-non-matrimonial-property-the-standish-case/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeremy Simison]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 06 Aug 2025 21:03:56 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Case Studies]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.trinitychambers.com/?p=1739</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Standish v Standish [2025] UKSC 26 The two questions answered by the case of Standish are when does non-matrimonial property become matrimonial property? And how is the ‘sharing principle’ applied to such property in financial remedy proceedings? The factual background, as is often the position in financial remedy cases, that ascend to the Court of [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com/clarifying-matrimonial-and-non-matrimonial-property-the-standish-case/">Clarifying Matrimonial and Non Matrimonial Property, the Standish Case</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com">Trinity Chambers</a>.</p>
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<p><a href="https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/uksc-2024-0089"><em>Standish v Standish</em> [2025] UKSC 26</a></p>
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<p>The two questions answered by the case of Standish are when does non-matrimonial property become matrimonial property? And how is the ‘sharing principle’ applied to such property in financial remedy proceedings?</p>
<p>The factual background, as is often the position in financial remedy cases, that ascend to the Court of Appeal and beyond, relates to a large capital pot and falls firmly into the category of ‘big money cases.’</p>
<p><span style="text-decoration: underline;">The Facts</span></p>
<p>The parties were married in 2005. The H was 72 and the W was 57 at the date of the appeal. There were two children of the marriage. Both parties were previously married. They separated in 2020. There were substantial assets including the family home valued at £21.6m. The nub of the appeal issue was that H transferred to W, towards the end of the marriage, £77.8m as part of a tax planning scheme. The purpose of the transfer being found to establish a Trust for the benefit of the two children of the marriage. The provenance of those assets were the H’s and were accepted to be non- matrimonial at source. The trial Judge divided the matrimonial property, which included the 2017 monies, 60:40 in the H’s favour to reflect his unmatched capital contribution. The W was awarded £45m.</p>
<p>The Court of Appeal allowed the H’s cross appeal. Held: the 2017 transfer of £77.8m to W did not become matrimonial property and the W’s award was reduced to £25m. The W appealed to the Supreme Court, she maintained that the 2017 transfer was essentially a gift and the COA was in error in failing to recognise this and that it was wrong to conclude that those assets remained non-matrimonial property.</p>
<p><span style="text-decoration: underline;">The Principles</span></p>
<p>It is important to emphasise that in many cases there is insufficient capital and income to meet needs. In the event that needs are not met by the matrimonial assets, the court will look to non- matrimonial assets to meet those needs and this is principle was established in the cases of S v S [2014] EWHC 4732(Fam); X v C [2022] EWFC 79.</p>
<p><span style="text-decoration: underline;">The Application of the Sharing Principle</span></p>
<p>There is a distinction between matrimonial and non-matrimonial property and the application of distinguishing them is the important preliminary exercise in any case.</p>
<p>Generally, assets which either spouse owned prior to the marriage or they have been gifted or inherited during the course of the marriage are non-matrimonial. These are not subject to the sharing principle (the principles of need and compensation fall within the exceptions).</p>
<p>Assets which have been acquired or earned during the course of the marriage are often regarded as matrimonial in specie and are often referred to as ‘the fruits of the marriage.’</p>
</div>
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<p>The principle relating to matrimonial assets is that they are subject to the sharing principle and the starting point may be equal sharing but this does not necessarily follow and is subject to the facts.</p>
<p>Finally, the principle of matrimonialisation may apply to assets and this is where an asset has started off life as non-matrimonial but during the course of the marriage has become a marital asset by virtue of its treatment, this is subject to degree. The Supreme Court made plain the following:</p>
<ol>
<li>The concept of matrimonialisation should not be treated narrowly [52]:<br />
‘ &#8230;what is important &#8230; is to consider how the parties have been dealing with the asset and whether this shows that, over time, they have been treating the asset as shared between them. ‘</li>
<li>The sharing principle must be ‘tied back’ to seeking a fair outcome. [54]</li>
<li>The pragmatic exercise of assessing whether the matrimonial property is somuch greater than the non- matrimonial property that:<br />
&#8216;&#8230; it is unfair to the parties- to try to work out what percentage was non- matrimonial. Fairness (in saving needless expense) demands that one should instead simply treat it all as matrimonial property.’ [55]</li>
<li>The transfer of property into the name of one or both of the parties to the marriage did not render the asset matrimonialised. [56]</li>
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<p>Tina Harrington<br />
Georgia Taylor (Mini Pupil)<br />
Trinity Chambers July 2025</p>
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<p>The post <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com/clarifying-matrimonial-and-non-matrimonial-property-the-standish-case/">Clarifying Matrimonial and Non Matrimonial Property, the Standish Case</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com">Trinity Chambers</a>.</p>
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		<title>For the Love of Dog</title>
		<link>https://www.trinitychambers.com/for-the-love-of-dog/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeremy Simison]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 28 Jan 2025 20:28:55 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Articles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Case Studies]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.trinitychambers.com/?p=1656</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>FI v DO [2024] EWFC 384 (B) I blinked twice in disbelief. This subject. This case name. I checked the calendar, but it was not the first of April. It is a dog case called FI v DO, doubtless with a twinkle in the eye. This was an application for financial remedy issued by H [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com/for-the-love-of-dog/">For the Love of Dog</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com">Trinity Chambers</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/OJ/2024/384.html">FI v DO [2024] EWFC 384 (B)</a></p>
<p>I blinked twice in disbelief. This subject. This case name. I checked the calendar, but it was not the first of April. It is a dog case called FI v DO, doubtless with a twinkle in the eye.</p>
<p>This was an application for financial remedy issued by H in 2023. In 2024 he issued a further application – for shared care of a golden retriever identified only as N.</p>
<p>The financial remedy issue is familiar territory to many practitioners: the sale of the family home and the division of net proceeds, the Court taking account of the needs of the children who lived with W.  Neither were able to rehouse in purchased accommodation from the proceeds of sale. Not a big money case.</p>
<p>H sought a declaration as to ownership of the dog and a shared care arrangement. W said she did not think it was in the dog’s best interests to spend time with H given H’s behaviour. That behaviour was when H was visiting the grave of a previous dog when (he claimed) he saw N (the dog) running off the lead. In cross examination he admitted that the dog had been with W’s mother (but that he had more right to the dog) and the dog had initially run off from him before he got her back. He said that he always kept a collar and lead in his car and that this was definitely not a planned event. He said he had a need for the dog for his mental health and the children need not be told about the dog-duction.</p>
<p>‘<em>At times it seems to me that I was in the realms of a Children Act application which featured a dog when the W was cross examined about the dog’s welfare and shared care arrangements</em>,’ DJ Crisp observed.</p>
<p><em>RK v RK</em> [2011] EWHC 3901 (Fam) was argued, though the dog in that case was not the primary focus of the litigation. In that case Moylan J determined the ownership of the dog on the determination of the primary carer.</p>
<p>DJ Crisp followed this logic: it was not who had paid for the dog or even who had cared for the dog previously, but the fact that W had provided care of the dog from separation for 18 months. ‘<em>The dog’s home is with the wife, and she should stay there</em>,’ she concluded</p>
<p>Pets can represent substantial investments in financial terms and are also valued members of our families. As treasured and pampered family members, we want to argue that their welfare is a relevant concern in proceedings. People can be more passionate about their dog, cat or canary than about many things. We love our pets.</p>
<p>In this case, the decision about the dog did take account of her welfare. Consideration was given to the person who provided care and the quality of that care. The W provided a safe home and that is where the dog belonged. This is treating the dog as more than a mere chattel, though that remains the legal category for now. Perhaps this is opening a dog’s door to a new assessment of welfare.</p>
<p>Andrew Bailey</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com/for-the-love-of-dog/">For the Love of Dog</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com">Trinity Chambers</a>.</p>
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		<title>A not so superb investment opportunity &#8211; SPS Groundworks &#038; Building Ltd v Mahil [2022] EWHC 371 (QB)</title>
		<link>https://www.trinitychambers.com/a-not-so-superb-investment-opportunity-sps-groundworks-building-ltd-v-mahil-2022-ewhc-371-qb/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeremy Simison]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 17 Jan 2025 12:21:41 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Case Studies]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.trinitychambers.com/?p=1609</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>On 12th February 2019 a plot of land in Stoughton, Leicestershire was sold at auction. In the auction catalogue, the land was described as having an ‘excellent scope for development’ and as being a ‘superb investment opportunity’. The hammer fell on Ms Mahil’s bid of £130,000. She signed a memorandum of sale and paid the [&#8230;]</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com/a-not-so-superb-investment-opportunity-sps-groundworks-building-ltd-v-mahil-2022-ewhc-371-qb/">A not so superb investment opportunity &#8211; SPS Groundworks &#038; Building Ltd v Mahil [2022] EWHC 371 (QB)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com">Trinity Chambers</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On 12th February 2019 a plot of land in Stoughton, Leicestershire was sold at auction. In the auction catalogue, the land was described as having an ‘excellent scope for development’ and as being a ‘superb investment opportunity’. The hammer fell on Ms Mahil’s bid of £130,000. She signed a memorandum of sale and paid the 10% deposit with an agreed completion date the following month.</p>
<p>A short while later, Ms Mahil refused to complete the purchase having rescinded the contract. The seller accepted her refusal as a repudiatory breach of contract. The land was later sold at a second auction and the seller brought proceedings in respect of the shortfall between the price agreed and that subsequently obtained. Ms Mahil alleged that she was induced into the contract by misrepresentation, and that there was a failure to disclose a defect in the title to the land.</p>
<p><u>A defect in title</u></p>
<p>As the Ms Mahil was leaving the auction, she was approached by a representative of Stoughton Parish Council who presented her with a copy of a letter stating that it would not be possible to build on the land. Far from being ripe for development, the land was registered with Harborough District Council as local green space and protected from development. The day after, Ms Mahil’s sons downloaded the legal pack and discovered an overage clause. The clause provided for payment to the Co-operative Limited of 50% of any increase in land’s value attributable to obtaining planning permission.</p>
<p><u>At first instance </u></p>
<p>Although the auctioneer made no express reference to the overage clause, the legal pack did provide pertinent information: it contained the deed of covenant along with the draft contract containing the requirement for the purchaser to enter into the covenant. The legal pack was readily available on the auction website and catalogues were available at the registration desk on the day of the auction. Signs were prominently displayed encouraging people to read the legal packs. The auctioneer also mentioned the need to read the legal packs before bidding. The Claimant had not read the legal pack and had bid blindly. At first instance, it was held that the starting point was caveat emptor. As regards the planning opportunities, the judge found that a reasonable man would consider there was ‘still opportunity for the land to be developed.’ Six grounds of appeal were granted, the first two are discussed below.</p>
<p><u>On appeal</u></p>
<p><u>Caveat emptor</u></p>
<p>The Appellant argued that equity requires the vendor to disclose all known defects, and the disclosure must be put in the purchaser’s mind. Furthermore, the vendor cannot rely on contractual terms which deem the buyer to have had knowledge of the defect. The appeal judge turned to <em>Farqui v English Real Estate </em>[1978] WLR 963 in which it was stated that: ‘it has long time been the view of equity that if there is a defect in the title and the vendor knows that there is a defect — and in the present case there can be no question but that the vendor knew there was a defect — then it is the duty of the vendor to disclose the same fully and frankly in the particulars or in the conditions, or at any rate in some place where the purchaser&#8217;s attention will be drawn to it..’ The Appellant also relied on a passage in Chitty (33<sup>rd</sup> edn) which set out that a contract for the sale of land are not uberrimae fidei in the sense that the vendor has to make to the purchaser a full disclosure of all material facts. It was held that the judge at first instance failed to properly apply the equitable principle of disclosure and wrongly took into account the maxim of caveat emptor which does not apply to defects in title. It was held that the references in the brochure, and by the auctioneer, to the need to read the legal pack were not enough to comply with the duty of disclosure.</p>
<p><u>Misrepresentations </u></p>
<p>As to the land’s ‘excellent scope for development’ and it being ‘a superb investment opportunity, it was held that the learned judge erred in finding that a reasonable person would have reached this conclusion given that four-fifths of it could not be built on. It was held the judge at first instance failed to grapple with the difference between what the Respondent believed to be true and the opinion stated. Whilst he was entitled to find that the Respondent held the view that he did, no reasonable person could have honestly equated that view to ‘excellent scope’ even pointing to the need for planning permission.</p>
<p><u>Comment</u></p>
<p>The case raises the important issue of a vendor’s duty of disclosure and the point at which compliance with that duty is met. Full and frank disclosure, in this case, meant that the overage clause should have been specifically brought to the buyer’s attention. It was not enough to refer to the need to read the legal pack before bidding; the Appellant was entitled to assume the duty of disclosure had been complied with and that as a result there would be no unusual defects revealed in the legal pack. The incautious approach to bidding blindly at an auction, having failed to have made proper enquiries as to the land and incumbrances will not relieve the seller of its duty of full and frank disclosure. As Cotter J put it: ‘the vendor is bound to give the purchaser full, frank and fair information, or a fair and proper opportunity to gain such information, about any defect.’</p>
<p>Let the seller beware!</p>
<p>Adam Jones</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com/a-not-so-superb-investment-opportunity-sps-groundworks-building-ltd-v-mahil-2022-ewhc-371-qb/">A not so superb investment opportunity &#8211; SPS Groundworks &#038; Building Ltd v Mahil [2022] EWHC 371 (QB)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.trinitychambers.com">Trinity Chambers</a>.</p>
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